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CIVIL JURIES AND COMPLEX CASES: 
TAKING STOCK AFTER TWELVE YEARS 
Introduction 
Twelve years ago, a s  the first Reagan administration was coming into office, i t  appeared 
that  the civil jury, at least in complex cases, might be on the way out. The hostility of the then 
Chief Justice, Warren Burger, toward the civil jury was no secret (Burger, 1979; Sperlich, 1982), 
and a split in the Circuits on the question of whether there was a complexity exception to the 
Seventh Amendment made the issue ripe for Supreme Court resolution. Moreover, a then recent 
body of scholarship provided the Court with some historical justification for reading a complexity 
exception into the Seventh Amendment (Devlin, 1980; Campbell and Le Poidevin, 1980; but see 
Arnold, 1980) as  well a s  with more modern policy arguments for eliminating the civil jury or 
dramatically altering its tasks in complex litigation (see e.g. Ell, 1978; Jorde, 1981; Luneberg and 
Nordenberg, 1981; Devitt, 1980-8 1; Rubin, 1982). The Supreme Court did not, however, seize .the 
moment, and the issue remains unresolved, which is to say that  most federal courts feel obligated 
by the Seventh Amendment to try legal cases to juries no matter what their complexities so long 
as a t  least one party insists.l 
In  failing to act the Court was acting wisely, or so I argued in an  article published in 1981 
entitled "Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment." (Lempert, 1981) That 
article was premised on the following points: First, that  the framers of the Seventh Amendment 
had important and enduring reasons for constitutionalizing the right to trial by jury in civil cases; 
second, that  the claim that  a complexity exception was implicit in the Seventh Amendment lacked 
adequate historical support; and third, that  even if the Seventh Amendment contained no 
complexity exception, Fifth Amendment due process gave civil litigants the right to insist on bench 
trials if a judge could be expected to decide a litigant's case rationally and a jury, even with the aid 
of reformed procedures, could not. 
I commended judicial inaction on the issue because a t  the time I wrote the empirical 
evidence was insufficient to determine whether some cases were so complex that  only a bench trial 
was likely to yield a rational judgment. To show that bench trials were required for rational 
decision making meant, I argued, that one would have to show: first, that  i t  was possible to 
identify a set of cases so complex that juries did not deal rationally with them; second, that  such 
The Supreme Court has never applied the Seventh Amendment to the states so as a matter of 
federal constitutional law state courts are free to eliminate jury trials in civil actions. However, 
many states are bound by their own constitutions to offer jury trials in actions at law. 
failures of rationality were inherent in the institution of jury trial and not the result of mutable 
ways of treating jurors or developing cases for trial; and, third, that  judges were likely to decide 
such cases more rationally than j ~ r i e s . ~  
Almost twelve years have passed since I wrote my article. One might expect that  we now 
have the data needed to determine whether the showings I argued for can be made. If so, 
perhaps the Supreme Court can give us a sound, empirically-based resolution of the "complexity 
exception" issue that  has for so long been on "hold." This paper examines the research produced 
during the past twelve years to see if this is the case. It seeks to determine what we now know 
which we did not know then about the ability of juries to handle complex cases, about our capacity 
for improving that  ability and about the ability of judges to improve upon jury performance in 
such cases. It asks whether there is an  adequate empirical basis for concluding: (1) that  juries can 
or cannot cope with complex cases; (2) that  we can or cannot change the way jury trials are 
conducted so that  rational jury decision making will not be thwarted by complexity; and (3) that  
judges can cope with complex issues that  juries cannot master. 
To avoid keeping the reader too long in suspense let me say at the outset that  the answer 
to each of the three aspects of this question is "no." There has been no outpouring of empirical 
research on these topics, and such research as  has been done is either too flawed or too limited to 
provide answers with firm empirical foundations. Certainly there is not the kind of research on 
which a social scientist would have the Supreme Court rely. And yet we have learned something. 
To anticipate the discussion that  follows, the jury often appears to do surprisingly well in the face 
of complexity, particularly in so far a s  complexity is defined by trial length and the introduction of 
massive arrays of evidence. As for the judge, we know little about his or her capacity to cope with 
complexity, but what we do know gives us no reason to be confident tha t  the judge will do better 
than the jury. We also lack the kinds of rigorous research needed to argue that  reforms in case 
management or jury practice can solve perceived problems, yet we are  at a point where a number 
of reforms can be suggested with little risk that  they will make things worse and considerable 
reason to believe they will improve jury performance. Finally, theoretical developments in 
In a situation were neither judges nor juries could be expected to resolve a matter rationally, i t  
may be, a s  some commentators have suggested, that  the resolution of the issue could be vested in 
some other institution, such as  a panel of experts. (Luneberg and Nordenberg, 1981; Strawn and 
Munsterman, 1982) In the setting of a law suit such an alternative institution might be confined 
by the constitution to the limited role that  due process requires; it might, for example, resolve 
difficult technical questions, which the decision maker, whether judge or jury, would then take as 
proven in deciding a case. Outside that  class of actions which are "legal" within the meaning of 
the Seventh Amendment, a broader role might be accorded expert decision makers a s  is often done 
in administrative agencies. 
cognitive and jury psychology suggest a new perspective that  we might wish to bring to bear in 
thinking about the complexity problem. I shall deal with these matters in turn. 
JURIES AND COMPLEX CASES 
There are many dimensions to complexity, but one feature that  stands out in the 
discussion of complex cases is protraction. The "horrible examples" in the literature on complex 
cases, that  is those cases cited as  self-evidently unsuitable for jury trial by those who would 
abrogate the right to jury trial, a re  cases that  take a long time to try to a verdict. Trial length is 
important to the argument against jury trial because lengthy trials (1) raise serious problems of 
juror memory; (2) are associated with massive amounts of information for the jury to comprehend; 
(3) mean that  large numbers of jurors, including a disproportionate number of those most likely to 
be especially capable, are excused from jury service and (4) can impose hardships on jurors who do 
serve hardships that  in theory might interfere with juror performance by causing resentment. 
Perhaps because protraction is seen as  a central feature of complex litigation, 
psychologists in their mock jury studies have seldom focused explicitly on the issue of jury fact 
finding in complex cases. Instead, most of what we have learned during the past decade about the 
jury's capacity to cope with complexity is anecdotal; i t  is based on close attention to jury behavior 
in particular cases chosen because of their research convenience or celebrity. Table One identifies 
and summarizes important characteristics of cases reported in the literature which meet two 
principal criteria. First, the case had to be one that  could be regarded as  complex by virtue of 
either its,length or subject matter. Second, the case description had to focus in substantial 
measure on the jury's performance, and the author's assessment of this performance had to be 
based a t  least in part  on interviews with some or all of the jurors who participated in the case. 
While the focus of this paper is on civil trials, cases involving criminal trials are  included in Table 
One. Although the legal question regarding the right to jury trial in complex cases may for 
constitutional reasons have a different answer in the criminal than in the civil context, the 
problems that  complexity poses for juror decision making do not necessarily differ with case type.3 
3 The cases included in the Table are a convenience sample, some of which had come to my 
attention before I wrote this paper and others of which were uncovered by a research assistant. 
When I starting writing the first draft of this paper I was  aware of no other case studies meeting 
the criteria of inclusion. Since completing the first draft  I have learned of several additional case 
studies that  meet my criteria, but including the ones I looked into would lengthen the paper 
without changing any of the conclusions I reached based on the current sample. It is important to 
recognize that  my sample of cases is a nonrandom selection which contains a disproportionate 
There are, of course, serious problems in relying on anecdotal case histories. There is no 
reason to believe that  cases chosen for study are typical of the range of complex cases either in 
the nature and extent of their comp1exit.y or in the ways that  judges, jurors and lawyers reacted to 
that  complexity. Moreover, the case. study methodology is not designed to be reproducible. 
Different authors viewing different cases choose to emphasize different features, and where they 
do focus on the same issues, standards for judgment may vary. These problems are compounded 
in the current instance, for many of the studies collected in Table One were reported by journalists 
and not social scientists. Not only did these journalists wish to tell a good story, but they were 
seldom concerned with what their observations could tell us generally about jury behavior in the 
face of complexity. Nevertheless, I believe that there is much to be learned from looking a t  how 
jurors performed across a range of complex cases. Any conclusions reached on the basis of what 
we can learn from these cases studies must be tentative, but even tentative knowledge is better 
than a knowledge vacuum. 
Table One summarizes important features about each of the cases described. Across the 
top the case name is given if the author provided it and a shorthand reference is given if the 
author did not. Several of the cases described in The American Lawver are  among the most 
highly publicized and celebrated cases that  have been tried in this country in recent years. The 
remaining cases are less well known and a number may be considered "run of the mill" complex 
cases. None of the cases appears a s  formidable for a fact finder as  cases like SCRl Corp. v. Xerox 
Cars or Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp., which are  the kinds of cases most 
commonly cited by those arguing for a complexity exception, but were a complexity exception to 
the Seventh Amendment established, i t  is likely that  a t  least some of the civil cases listed would, 
upon motion of a party, be removed from the civil jury docket. 
Looking a t  the rows we see that  first the source of the case report is presented. The four 
cases attributed to the ABA's 1989 report were the product of cooperation between a team of 
social scientists and lawyers. The social scientists who were in charge of the data gathering and 
are, I presume, responsible for the descriptions presented, are Elizabeth Loftus, ~ a n e  Goodman 
and Edith Greene, three Ph.D. psychologists who have written extensively on issues relating to 
jury trial. Arthur Austin, who described the trial and retrial in the case of Cleveland v. Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Companv, an  antitrust case that  pitted a city against a privately owned 
utility, was a t  the time of his study a Professor ofJurisprudence a t  Case Western Reserve 
University. Molly Selvin and Larry Picus, who described Charles Newman v. Johns Manville, a 
number of "high profde" cases. The cases were not, however, selected because of their tendencies 
to prove or disprove any of the hypotheses examined in this paper. Indeed, i t  was not until the 
cases were selected and read that  their implications for the issues explored in this paper were 
known. My summaries of key case characteristics were checked by Lisa Bernt, a 1992 graduate 
of the University of Michigan Law School. 
tort suit to recover for asbestosis, were a t  the time they wrote researchers with the Rand 
Corporation's Civil Justice Research Institute. The remaining trial descriptions are the work of 
journalists and free lance writers, each of whom published in The American Lawver, a s  well as,  in 
the case of Pennzoil v. Texaco, a Wall Street Journal reporter and a trial juror. 
The second row notes whether the case was tried in a state court or a federal district 
court. The third row gives the subject matter of the case and notes if a case was a criminal 
prosecution. The fourth row specifies how long the trial of the case lasted, excluding jury 
deliberations. Sometimes it was not clear if jury deliberation time was excluded from the figures 
an  author provided. In these cases the length specified by the author is given. In other cases the 
trial time was given in days or hours. These figures were converted into days or weeks by 
assuming 5 hours to a trial day and five days to a trial week. 
Row 5 specifies sources of complexity apart  from length. In this column I note such things 
as  the presence of multiple counts or parties, conflicts of experts, hard to understand concepts, and 
the need to understand unfamiliar, technical information. 
Row 6 lists efforts the court made to make the case more amenable to a rational jury 
decision. These efforts' included such things as  allowing note-taking, giving preliminary 
instructions, providing trial notebooks that  organized crucial material and breaking down the 
verdict task into a series of special verdicts or a verdict to be decided upon only after answering a 
series of discrete questions. It turns out, however, that  the last of these aids - the use of special 
questions or verdict forms - had the potential t o m n i c a t e  a jury's task a s  well as to ease it.-.-- 
Row 7 gives the size of the jury. The four criminal cases were tried to twelve-person 
juries, but only two of the civil cases was decided by a jury of twelve. One civil case was heard by 
a n  eight-person jury and the other cases were'heard by six-person juries. 
Row 8 gives m y  reading of a jury's likely difficulty in understanding technical or 
specialized evidence tha t  appeared crucial to a correct decision. I use a three word scale: high, 
moderate and low. Where a large amount of hard to understand, unfamiliar scientific information 
bore on the central issues in the case technical difficulty was coded as "high." Where technical or 
specialized information seemed somewhat easier to understand or where full understanding 
seemed less crucial to correct decision making, because the evidence was not so central, or because 
it was redundant with other easier to understand evidence or because a vaguer understanding 
would suffice, difficulty was coded a s  "moderate" or "low" depending on how these factors 
appeared to play out. 
Row 9 provides information on the number of college educated jurors where that  
information was provided in the report. Where occupational but not  educational information was 
given, I attempted to estimate the number of college educated jurors on the basis of their 
occupations. These estimates are  marked with an asterisk. 
Row 10 assesses the defensibility of the jury's verdict. Here I tried to mirror the views of 
the authors of the various reports, except I ignored the views of the juror writing about Pennzoil 
who thought the jury had done a fine job. If the author reported that the jury's verdict agreed 
with the judge's verdict preference or if the author conveyed an impression that the jury's verdict 
was correct, I coded verdict defensibility as  "high." Where the jury's verdict seemed reasonable 
yet it would not necessarily have agreed with the judge's or the author questioned its adequacy, I 
coded defensibility a s  "moderate." 
Finally where the author conveyed the impression that the jury's verdict was mistaken in 
important respects, I coded defensibility as  "low." I did this even if the jury verdict was arguably 
reasonable given the evidence that the jury had before it. 
Row 11 notes whether serious mistakes that might have misled the jury were made either 
by the judge or by one or more of the lawyers involved in the case. Finally, row 12 notes special 
features about each case, including any actions by the judge or lawyers that might have misled 
the jury or made its task more difficult. 
Trial Complexity 
The first thing to notice about Table One is the range of cases which are arguably 
complex, particularly if trial length alone indexes complexity. Corporate law violations, toxic 
torts, conspiracies, stock manipulations, sexual harassment allegations, claims under the antitrust 
laws, contract breaches and matters relating to trade secrets all may give rise to colorable claims 
of substantial complexity, and this is just a group of cases that happen to have caught the eye of 
courtroom observers. The point is not a small one. Even though the case for a complexity 
exception has been made in reference to cases that appear more complex than most of the cases 
summarized in Table One, if a complexity exception were to be created, the potential slippery 
slope problem is substantial. The prospect of lengthy trials and conflicting expert testimony on 
specialized topics would make most of the cases in Table One colorable candidates for the 
withdrawal of juries. In deciding whether to withdraw juries substantial judicial discretion would 
have to be exercised and even if a trial court stretched that discretion, an appellate court might 
well be reluctant to reverse given the prospect of expensive, time-consuming retrial and the 
difficulties an objector would have in showing that a judge's verdict was unreasonable. 
If one looks not a t  rows 4 or 5, which in litigation would form the basis for predictions of 
complexity, but a t  row 8, which reports the technical difficulty of evidence that seemed crucial to a 
correct disposition of the case, a somewhat different picture emerges. There were two cases that 
seemed to turn largely on evidence so specialized and esoteric that any non-specialist could be 
expected to have considerable difficulty in understanding. These were the ABA trade secrets case 
which involved highly technical testimony about subtle patent issues and the W.R. Grace case in 
which there was epidemiological evidence a s  well a s  conflicting expert testimony about difficult 
issues in hydrogeology. I label "moderate/highm the 1iabi.lity issue in the Johns Manville case which 
involved conflicting interpretations of pulmonary and lung function tests a s  well a s  statistical 
evidence on the association between exposure to asbestos and the development of asbestosis. Cases 
I have categorized a s  moderately complex are cases tha t  involved unfamiliar business situations 
like the need to understand normal practice in the junk bond market (an issue in Keating.) or the 
need to understand economic concepts at issue in antitrust cases such as  the need to understand 
the characteristics of a "relevant geographic market," a n  issue in the C.E.I. case. 
In those cases labeled low in difficulty esoteric and unfamiliar evidence either figured less 
prominently in the issues the jury had to resolve, or it should have been relatively easy for the 
jury to understand. Thus, in the sexual harassment case two psychiatrists testified for the 
plaintiff, but there were no expert witnesses for the defense and the plaintiff could have made out 
a case for both liability and damages even without the psychiatric testimony. In the GAF stock 
manipulation trial jurors had to understand how stock trading worked, a m a k r  that  most of the 
jurors in this case found to be difficult "new terrain," but this is the kind of information that  many 
lay jurors would know and which should be relatively easy to explain. The fact that  I have rated 
the evidence in a trial a s  low in difficulty, does not, however, mean that  jurors will understand it. 
In the C.E.II litigation, for example, the concept "natural monopoly" figured prominently in both 
trials. Compared to other testimony on the issue of monopolization, this concept should have been 
easy for a jury to understand, yet it appears from Austin's interviews that  in two trials only one 
alternate juror adequately understood what the defense, in making a claim of natural monopoly, 
was talking about. 
Overall, one may conclude from looking a t  these cases that  with some frequency trials 
confront jurors with evidence that  only experts have no difficulty understanding. Where such 
evidence is presented, jurors often find i t  hard to understand, and even where the evidence should 
be comprehensible to a jury, jurors chosen in a particular case may not comprehend. 
Yet the situation may not be so bleak as  this summary suggests. Methodologically, these 
case studies are retrospective reconstructions of how deliberations proceeded, and after the trial 
(in some of these studies weeks or months after) jurors may overstate the degree of confusion that  
existed in the jury room.* Moreover individual jurors who say that  "no one understood" an  issue 
may be speaking more for themselves than for others since those who did understand may not 
have had the occasion to directly exhibit their understanding to their fellow jurors or, if they 
attempted to do so, their understanding may not have been clear to the others. In this respect the 
Of course i t  is also possible for confusion to be understated after memories have faded. 
trials described in the ABA study are particularly important. The ABA study was conducted by 
trained researchers who both interviewed jurors who decided the cases they studied and observed 
the deliberations of alternate jurors who had been on the trial panels. It appears from what the 
authors observed that  in almost all cases the juries were led by their most competent members. 
Neil Vidmar (1992) reports thus, jurors with poor understanding of key evidence could be guided 
toward correct verdicts even if misunderstandings of the crucial evidence were never fully 
clarified. In W.R.Grace we see a perverse variant of this a s  the only juror who apparently 
understood the full legal implications of the way the jury answered a question on the verdict form 
kept quiet about what it meant because he liked the result the jury's answer would yield. 
Problems in Understandin~; 
The jury's problems in understanding are compounded by limited juror ability. As row 9 
reveals many of the juries involved in this case had few or no members with college education. 
Occupationally most of the jurors seated in these complex cases who worked outside the household 
had blue collar or clerical jobs. Since education and occupation are correlates of juror competence 
(Strodtbeck e t  al. 1957; Hastie e t  al. 1983), some of these juries may have had few people capable 
of providing intelligent leadership. However, this difficulty is not an intrinsic failure of the jury 
system. A number of commentators have suggested ways of dealing with this problem, including 
making i t  more difficult for the better educated to avoid jury duty or the sitting of full or partial. 
blue ribbon juries (Lempert, 1981; Nordenberg and Luneberg, 1981, 1982; Schwarzer, 1991). 
Moreover, even without changing the conditions of jury duty, highly capable juries may be seated 
if the lawyers, perhaps urged on by the judge, cooperate and do not routinely exercise their 
peremptory challenges on those jurors most likely to understand the case. Thus, in the D e b r e a n  
trial seven college educated individuals were on the jury, none of them missed a trial day or, for 
that  matter, arrived late, and, to judge by Brill's portrayal they performed a t  the highest level. 
Similarly, one of the judges interviewed by the ABA researchers reported that  in a complex case 
where both sides wanted an  intelligent jury, a highly capable jury was seated and three weeks of 
trial time was saved because the jurors brought depositions home to read after the trial day was 
through. 
A special problem of understanding arises when there is a conflict of expert testimony. 
The difficulty is that  when the two sides provide different interpretations of a situation, a person 
who previously knew nothing about the issue may have little basis for choosing between them. 
This is a generic problem with expert testimony, which exists almost apart  from its inherent 
degree of complexity (Gross, 1992). In these circumstances juries seem to rely heavily on other 
credibility cues (e.g. does the expert seem like a hired gun?) a s  well a s  on the way in which the 
evidence fits in with the other elements of the parties' stories. Thus, if it appears as  it did in the 
Pennzoil case, that a party acted improperly, the jury is less likely to believe an expert for the 
party who suggests that whatever the appearance, technically there was no impropriety, than it is 
to believe an expert who suggests that what was done violated commonly understood business 
norms. I t  should be recognized that juries commonly decide between conflicting non-expert 
testimony on such grounds as well, and to some extent they are celebrated for this. Thus, when a 
jury hears an eyewitness who places the defendant a t  the scene of the crime and a defendant's 
spouse who testifies that the defendant was home a t  the time of the crime, the jury weighs the 
relative credibility of the two witnesses and how their testimony fits into a larger story in deciding 
whom to believe. They may have no m'ore rational basis for deciding between such witnesses than 
they do for deciding between two experts who reach opposite conclusions about matters concerning 
which the jurors were previously ignorant. 
Yet the jury faces problems in dealing with conflicting but unfamiliar expert testimony, 
whether hard to understand or not, that it does not face to the same degree in dealing with the 
conflicting testimony of ordinary witnesses. The most important is that experts are selected by 
the parties to be convincing (Getman and Ellsworth, 1987; Champagne, et  al., 1991). In these 
circumstances, as  Professor Gross points out (1992), the normal cues to credibility are likely to be 
misleading, for a low credibility expert who testifies in a way that is unlikely to be believed is not 
likely to be hired. Indeed, one might expect those who know their cases are weak to make the 
strongest efforts to find experts who appear credible, for if they could not they would be foolish not 
to settle. At the same time, one should not overdraw the distinction between conflicting expert 
testimony and the conflicting testimony of ordinary witnesses, for if experts are adept a t  
appearing credible regardless of the credibility of their testimony, ordinary witnesses may appear 
credible or incredible for reasons that have little or nothing to do with credibility like the 
confidence of an eyewitness (Loftus, 1991) or class-based distinctions in speaking style (Lind and 
O'Barr, 1979). 
A second problem that distinguishes battles of experts from the conflicting testimony of 
ordinary witnesses, is that we feel that when ordinary witnesses tell conflicting stories there is 
little anyone can do but decide instinctively, on the basis of credibility cues and consistency with 
other evidence, who is telling the truth. .With experts there is often the feeling that if only the 
decision maker had sufficient expertise, a correct judgment would be made. This feeling gives rise 
to proposals for such things as  science courts (Martin, 1977) or ways to resolve the esoteric 
scientific issues that arise in litigation through the use of expert panels (Luneberg and 
Nordenberg, 1981; 1982). To the extent that the feeling is justified, there is a special threat posed 
by trying complex cases to juries or, in the usual case, to judges. This is a threat to legitimacy 
posed by the danger that  clearly incorrect decisions will be reached and that  this will become 
known after the fact. It is easy, however, to exaggerate the threat posed. Where experts differ in 
complex cases, the differences are usually sincere. Indeed, I would suggest that  the more difficult 
the issue - that  is the harder i t  is for the lay person to decide which expert's opinion is more 
credible - the more likely i t  is that  both positions are reasonably maintained. Thus, in the 
W.R.Grace case leading experts in hydrogeology differed on whether toxic wastes could pass 
beneath a river to contaminate the plaintiffs wells. While one side is undoubtedly right, it is 
likely that  hydrogeology today cannot tell us which it is. In these circumstances a jury response of 
downplaying the importance of the evidence, even though i t  is at the center of the proximate cause 
issue, and focusing on other evidence that  suggests contamination (how else can an exceptionally 
high incidence of leukemia be explained) and on the responsibility or irresponsibility of the 
defendants might be the best we can expect a decision maker, even an  expert decision maker, to 
do.5 
The Quality of Ju rv  Verdicts 
The bottom line, and perhaps the best test of whether jury leadership or other factors 
alleviate individual problems of understanding, is the quality of the verdicts that  juries return. 
Here the case studies have an  interesting tale to tell. It is summarized in row 10 which reports 
the defensibility of the jury verdicts from the perspective of the person describing the case6. The 
first thing to note is that  most jury verdicts seem defensible; they are close to the verdicts that 
judges would have rendered andlor they seem fair and reasonable. Also in cases where the jury 
had to decide both liability and damages, if the verdict appears mistaken, i t  is likely to be the 
holding on damages that  appears unsupported by the evidence rather than the finding of liability7. 
Moreover, where verdicts are of moderate or low defensibility, it does not appear that  the 
complexity of the jury's fact finding task is ordinarily a t  the heart of the problem. This can be 
best appreciated if we look closely a t  those cases with such verdicts. 
First, consider the ABA trade secrets case. The verdict is labeled moderately defensible 
because the judge's comments indicate agreement (though not in so many words) with the jury's 
5 This is not, I should note, what the jury did in the Grace case. Their verdict is discussed below. 
More precisely I a m  giving my subjective view of another observer's subjective view of the 
verdict quality. 
Since mistakes on damages can be corrected through remittitur either at the trial level or on 
appeal such mistakes are not a s  costly to the efficient administration of justice a s  mistakes on 
liability which, if caught, may require a new trial. 
finding for the counterclaim plaintiff on one count and with its findings for the counterclaim 
defendant on several other counts. However, the judge, it seems, would have found for the 
counterclaim plaintiff on two counts where the jury found for the defendant, and he would have 
granted greater damages than the jury did. Although the ABA trade secrets case is one of the 
most technically difficult of the cases in Table One, the jury's failure to arrive a t  a more 
acceptable verdict does not seem to stem from that  difficulty. In fact, eleven jurors, including five 
of the six who decided the case and the six alternates who for purposes of the study deliberated to 
a decision shared the judge's verdict preferences. The unsatisfactory nature of the jury verdict 
stems from a sixth juror who appeared not to understand the judge's instructions and forced a 
compromise by obstinately holding out for his preferred verdict. Thus it appears that  except for 
the kind of stubborn, uncomprehending juror who occasionally pops up regardless of complexity,8 
the jurors did very well. 
One wonders how such good performance was possible given the complexity of the case. A 
clue may be found in the lawyers comments about some of the most complex evidence. One 
attorney, suggesting that the jury probably never understood the complex chemistry underlying a 
zeolite production process, remarked that  the plaintiff never attempted to explain the chemistry 
involved because the case did not require that  knowledge. Another lawyer commenting on 
laboratory reports and scientific progress reports filled with chemical equations that  had been 
entered into evidence noted that  the reports may have been useful for their bulk a s  they were a 
way of making concrete the amount of experimental work that hadbeen done month by month. 
Thus one has a case that  in large measure doesn't seem comprehensible to a jury as  well a s  jurors 
who admit to being mystified by some of the evidence. Yet the jurors' verdict preferences, with 
one exception, seem eminently sensible, because a scientist's understanding of the evidence does 
not seem essential to the fair disposition of the case. 
The jury system also seems not to have done well in the two C.E.1, trials that Austin 
observed, a t  least this is a conclusion one may draw from the fact that  the jury verdicts in the two 
trials were inconsistent, with the first jury hanging 5 to 1 in favor of the plaintiff City of 
Cleveland and the second jury finding for the defendant. However, the inconsistency does not 
necessarily point to jury irrationality since, a s  Austin points out, the defendant's strategy changed 
between the two trials so that the different juries were hearing quite different presentations of the 
evidence. Moreover, one piece of evidence offered at the first trial , which the plaintiff had 
regarded a s  its "smoking gun," was ruled inadmissible a t  the second. 
Looking a t  the C.E.I. trials separately, I have rated the verdict at the second trial high on 
defensibility since it appears the judge agreed with it, while the hung jury outcome a t  the first 
8 This is why I argued in my 1981 article for non-unanimous juries in civil cases. 
trial is rated as  low on defensibility because the vote was 5-1 away from the direction the judge 
seems to have thought correct. While the jury's failure to understand some of the concepts and 
evidence relating to the antitrust issues may have played a part  in the jurors' votes, their poor 
performance, if it was poor, seems attributable to less esoteric reasons. The most important is 
probably that the jurors failed to limit the plaintiffs smoking gun evidence - testimony that C.E.I. 
had hired a lawyer to bring in his own name a suit designed to hamper the plaintiffs business - to 
the impeachment purposes for which i t  was a l l ~ w e d . ~  The other factors to which Austin 
attributes the first verdict are the jury's failure to understand other instructions and concepts like 
the meaning of proximate cause and the fact that  the jury took a n  early straw vote after which its 
deliberations did not function well. 
Thus, if the jury did not reach a defensible result in the first C.E.IL case, i t  does not appear 
that  the failure was due primarily to the case's complexity. Indeed, it is not clear that  the case 
was so complex as  to be beyond the ken of a jury. Rather the first jury, having no college-educated 
members, seems to have been especially ill-equipped to understand what may in principle have 
been comprehensible evidence. The second jury, while still failing to understand certain concepts, 
seems to have better understood the evidence, and this jury too consisted largely of blue collar 
workers, none of whom was a four year college graduate. The two juries differed however in that  
the second had several members who had substantial occupational responsibility. The other 
failures of the first jury, the failure to give proper weight to a limiting instruction and confusion 
about such concepts as  proximate cause are failures tha t  can and do occur in simple cases as well 
a s  complex ones (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork e t  al., 1977; 1981; Hastie e t  al., 1983; 
Ellsworth, 1989). 
In the W.R. Grace case, Pacelle, who authored the report I draw on, suggests that  the jury 
performed poorly because a new trial was needed due to the jury's inconsistent answers to special 
questions and to the fact that in giving an  allowed answer to one question the jury did not realize 
the implications of its answer. Pacelle, however, notes that  the question that  gave rise to the 
inconsistent answer was the poorly worded product of a day and a half of legal debating in the 
judge's chambers. Moreover, when the jury asked the court for help in understanding the question, 
the judge's remarks were as  confusing as  the initial question. The jurors, left to their own devices, 
came up with a reasonable interpretation of the question, but an  incorrect one, and their answer 
meant a new trial (almost immediately forestalled by a settlement) had to be ordered. 
The jurors' other problem in the case was that  they responded "not determined" to a 
special question asking when the W.R. Grace Company had polluted certain wells - not realizing 
9 This limitation strikes me as legally questionable, so the jury's performance might be better 
than the judge's in this case. 
that this answer meant the plaintiffs had not proved an  element of their case and so could not 
recover.lO The jurors were led into this decision by a verdict form which invited them to answer 
the question "not determined" without explaining the consequences of such an answer and by the 
plaintiffs counsel's failure - to the defense counsel's astonishment -to explain to the jury in 
closing argument the implications of a not determined verdict. The answer "not determined" does 
not, however, suggest jury incompetence. The W.R. Grace case, as  appears from the table, 
contained perhaps the most technical evidence of any of the cases discussed. It  would be difficult 
for any lay person, judges included, to decide between the conflicting expert testimony in the case, 
and even an expert might have felt that it was impossible to date the start  of the contamination to 
a specific month and year as  the question put to the jury apparently required. The Pennzoil 
case involved a suit by Pennzoil against the Texaco Corporation for tortiously interfering with an 
"agreement in principle" that Pennzoil had reached to take over the Getty Oil Company and 
purchase the stock in Getty held by the Getty museum. The jury's verdict on liability was 
probably wrong and its decisions on both actual and punitive damages appear hugely excessive. 
Yet judging by the three available reports it is difficult to blame these errors on the jury or on the 
complexity of the case, even though the jury's apparent failure to understand certain key words, - 
"indemnities" and "agreement in principle" - fostered jury mistakes. The jury's failure to 
understand the implications of certain promises of indemnity that Texaco had given the Getty 
interests played a major role in the jury's decision to award Pennzoil three billion dollars in 
punitive damages, but this failure appears attributable, a t  least in part to the trial judge's decision 
to exclude evidence of other litigation brought by Pennzoil which, Adler tells us, was "the only 
good way for Texaco to convince the jury that Pennzoil could have sued the Getty interests if it 
had wanted to - indemnities notwithstanding." The problem caused by the exclusion of the "other 
litigation" evidence was compounded in the deliberations on punitive damages when the jury asked 
a question bearing on Texaco's possible responsibility for actions of Getty interests and the defense 
was content with a reply instructing the jury to reread the instructions. Defense counsel were 
content with this reply because they believed the instructions contained a sentence there which 
told the jury that the defendant was responsible only for its own actions. The evening after the 
jury's inquiry, defense counsel discovered there was no such sentence, but the next day the judge 
lo One juror, the jury's only college-educated member, understood the implications of the answer. 
This juror kept quiet because he was the defendant's strongest proponent within the jury room. 
l1 This does not mean that the jury would have been acting irrationally had they realized the 
consequences of a "not determined" answer and reported a date. The jurors might reasonably 
have been confident that by a certain time the contamination had begun, and might a t  least have 
put this down. The question, however, called for the earliest date on which the contamination 
could, by a preponderance of the evidence, be shown to have happened. 
refused to give the jury a supplementary charge to correct this deficiency. The $7.53 billion 
awarded for actual damages was exactly the amount Pennzoil sought. This may well be $7 billion 
dollars more than the evidence justified, assuming Pennzoil was correct in its liability claim, but it 
is hard to fault the jury on this issue or to attribute the excess to the complexity of the damage 
issue. Rather the jury's award reflects the testimony of three witnesses whom Pennzoil offered on 
the damage issue one of whom had particularly high credibility, and to Texaco's decision to put on 
no evidence that  contradicted this testimony. Thus when the jury deliberated the only evidence 
before them was that  which tended to establish Pennzoil's full claim, and, a s  a juror pointed out in 
deliberations, the jury had been instructed to decide the case on the evidence. 
On the liability issue i t  is similarly difficult to attribute the verdict, assuming it was 
mistaken, to the case's complexity or to the jury's inability to follow the evidence. Rather jury 
errors, if they occurred, can be explained by judicial rulings on the admissibility of evidence, the 
court's charge, which according to both Adler and Petzinger favored Pennzoil in a variety of ways, 
and to certain strategic errors of the defense team, such a s  the failure to offer expert evidence 
about how the crucial term "agreement in principle" was  understood in the business world. 
MicroNest v. ComputerLand was a contract action brought primarily against William 
Millard, the C.E.O. of ComputerLand and secondarily against the corporation. It was brought to 
recover on a clause in a loan agreement that  allowed the note holder to convert the debt into 
shares of ComputerLand stock, but the plaintiff also sued under a novel theory of conversion 
which allowed it to claim that  dividends owed on the stock allegedly due the noteholders had been 
tortiously converted to the defendant's own use. This theory was important because it provided a 
basis for claiming substantial punitive damages. In  the MicroNest case, unlike Pennzoil, it 
appears that  the jury's verdict on liability was well-merited; indeed before the trial began defense 
counsel sent his client a letter warning that  "the case was indefensible" and that  if he didn't settle, 
he could be "exposed to ... huge punitive damages." 
The award of punitive damages, over $125,000,000 against the two defendants, seems on 
the other hand excessive; indeed, it is unclear whether any punitive damages were justified. 
While part  of the reason for the award appears to be tha t  the jury "remembered" an  instruction 
that  was never given - thzt  punitive damages had to hur t  - this failure of memory does not appear 
due to massive evidence - the trial on punitive damages followed the return of the general verdict 
and only lasted a few days - or to evidence that  was particularly complex. Indeed, the jury's 
mistake seems to be due more to a lack of evidence than to a surfeit. The defense attempted to 
set  a n  implausibly low value on ComputerLandYs net worth and presented no evidence on what 
Millard was worth. More importantly the trial judge excluded evidence of a partial summary 
judgment that  left open the issue the jury had tried; this evidence tended to refute the plaintiffs 
contention that  Millard was using the trial in bad faith to get out of honoring his note. Defense 
counsel said of this ruling, "It was a devastating setback. I literally was stunned." The plaintiff 
like the defendant offered little evidence on the defendant's net worth but was nonetheless allowed 
to refer to Millard numerous times a s  a billionaire and to give a n  estimate of the value of 
ComputerLand stock. Of course, the trial judge's questionable decision to allow the plaintiff to add 
a theory of tortious conversion to its contract case made the punitive damage award possible in 
the first place. 
The final case in which the reporter seriously questions the quality of the jury's decision 
making is the asbestosis case, Charles Newman e t  al. v. Johns Manville e t  al., described by 
Selvin and Picus. This is a case in which'three insulators and the wife of an  insulator claimed 
they developed asbestosis due to exposure to the defendant's product. These four claimants were 
"bellwether" plaintiffs for a group of thirty cases that  had been consolidated for trial in a federal 
district court. The authors point to a number of errors that  seem to have infected the verdict, but 
a s  with most of the other verdicts that  have been described it is hard to link the authors' criticisms 
to a failure to understand the admittedly complex evidence in the case. Two of the authors' 
complaints concern the jury's failure to follow judicial instructions, one being a limiting instruction 
regarding evidence admissible against only one of ten defendants and another being an instruction 
on permissible bases of damages. l2 These kinds of failures are found in simple cases as well a s  
complex ones, and no data suggests their likelihood of occurrence increases with case complexity. 
In  the particular context of the Manville case, the first error is one that, a s  a matter of psychology 
it may have been difficult or impossible for the jurors to avoid, while the second failure may be the 
kind of justice-oriented nullification of the law for which some might value the civil jury, akin, for 
example, to jury awards that  take account of the fact that  parties will have to pay attorneys' fees. 
l2 The authors' description of the deliberations is based on one collective interview held several 
months after the trial had ended. &search on limiting instructions~suggests that  the admitted 
role of the forbidden evidence may have loomed larger a t  the time of the discussion, when the 
limiting instructions may have been forgotten, than i t  would have had the interview immediately 
followed the trial. The reason is not that  jurors are unaffected by evidence they are instructed not 
to consider or to consider only for a limited purpose, but rather that  jurors often act during their 
deliberations as  if they will not be improperly influenced. Thus, if we may rely on studies of mock 
juries, when a juror mentions evidence the jury has been instructed not to consider another juror 
often points out that  the evidence is not to be considered, and i t  receives no further overt attention. 
Nevertheless, such evidence may well have the effects the instructions were designed to eliminate. 
(Hans & Doob, 1976; Casper e t  al., 1989) What may have happened over time is that  the jurors 
forgot they were not supposed to consider certain evidence and accurately reported the effects that  
evidence had upon them, even though a t  the time these effects would have seemed insubstantial to 
one observing the jury deliberation. This possibility seems more plausible with respect to the 
documents that were improperly used- against defendants other than the one charged with their 
production than it does in the case of the jury's apparent defiance of the judge's instructions not to 
make awards for past medical damages. On the damage issue the jurors reported a formula they 
used, something they seem unlikely to misremember, and the formula awarded money for past 
medical expenses contrary to the judge's instructions. 
The third critique that  Selvin and Picus make of the Johns Manville jury is that  i t  appears 
the jurors diminished the amount awarded one plaintiff because he was a Mexican national. The 
authors suggest the possibility of discriminatory motives. If these existed, they are not a result of 
complexity, but by my reading of the facts the case for discrimination is not made. 1 3  
Finally, there is one respect in which the jurors misunderstood the scientific facts. They 
assumed in their deliberations that  the asbestosis which they found each of the plaintiffs to be 
suffering from would progress to the point where each would become as sick as the lead plaintiff. 
Given the nature of asbestosis, however, even if the jurors were correct in accepting the asbestosis 
diagnosis of the plaintiffs' doctors they were almost certainly incorrect in awarding damages with 
the expectation that  each plaintiff would inevitably become seriously disabled by the disease. 
-However, it is again hard to fault the jury for their error or to blame i t  on the complexity of the 
case. The jurors had been told that  asbestosis was a progressive disease, and the defendant never 
put on a witness to tell the jury of the wide variability with which the disease progressed. 
Sources of Difficultv 
Considering the group of case studies we see that  there is often evidence in complex cases 
that  jurors do not fully understand and that  the jury does not always get things right in reaching a 
verdict. At the same time complexity, particularly as  operationalized by protraction or large 
amounts of evidence is not necessarily confusing, and even when the evidence is quite difficult to 
follow jurors may understand much of i t  and reach verdicts that  in retrospect appear both justified 
and rational. Moreover, when jury verdicts seem mistaken, it is difficult to attribute the mistakes 
largely to the complexity of the evidence the jurors encountered and to their difficulty in 
understanding it. Rather, a s  I read the case studies, erroneous verdicts seem to have two general 
sources: one is the kinds of factors that  can lead jurors astray in ordinary cases and the other is 
the mistakes of lawyers of or judges. 
The most serious problem that  jurors encounter in their efforts to get things right appears 
to be an  inability to correctly apply instructions. Yet this is a long standing problem, which 
applies whether cases are'complex or simple. (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork e t  al., 1977, 
1981; Hastie e t  al., 1983; Ellsworth, 1989) Moreover, we know how to increase comprehension 
l3 Not only did the jurors have reason to believe that  the plaintiffs future earnings might be 
diminished by the likelihood he would return to Mexico, but the adjustment made was not great 
and avoided a situation in which this plaintiff would have been awarded more than a plaintiff, 
albeit with a shorter life expectancy, who was far sicker than he was. Moreover, when punitive 
damages were apportioned, this plaintiff received $1 million, the same as each of the other 
plaintiff. 
substantially (Charrow and Charrow, 1979; Elwork e t  al., 1981; Sales e t  al., 1977) but little effort 
has been made in this direction. (Tanford, 1991) The difficulty jurors have in understanding 
instructions poses a special problem in complex litigation that has not heretofore been recognized. 
A standard way of attempting to aid jurors in complex cases is to break down the juryis decision 
making task through special verdict forms, special interrogatories and other such devices, and 
there is some evidence that jurors find them helpful (Heuer & Penrod, no date). Yet these devices 
are themselves instructions and carry with them the danger of misunderstanding. The best 
example of how well-meaning efforts to simplify the jurors task can lead to juror error occurred 
when John DeLorean, after his acquittal on drug charges, was tried in Detroit for federal fraud, 
racketeering and tax evasion (Howell, 1988). He was acquitted even though three of the twelve 
jurors said after the trial that they left the deliberations believing that DeLorean was guilty. The . 
reason for DeLoreanys acquittal was a special verdict form which read in part: 
You must remember a t  all times that the accused cannot be found guilty ... unless 
you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a t  least two 
acts of racketeering. You must not only unanimously agree as  to which of the 
eleven specific acts of racketeering were committed, if any, but also which specific 
subpart of each alleged act was committed. Wi h 
vou must find the defendant not p i l t v  ... (emphasis added). 
The jury, which disagreed about whether DeLorean had committed the requisite two acts 
of racketeering, returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the racketeering charge because the 
special verdict form seemed to mandate an acquittal if they could not reach unanimous agreement. 
In somewhat less dramatic fashion several of the less defensible verdicts returned in the 
trials listed in Table One seem to have been similarly affected by the jury's difficulty in dealing 
with special questions or special verdict forms. Thus in the J!LUhx case the jury never knew 
the consequences of concluding "not determined" on the special verdict form, and they 
misinterpreted the meaning of another of the special verdict questions, and in J'ennzoil, the 
wording of eight special questions that the judge posed for the jury was, according to Adler, tilted 
against the defendant. I t  should also be noted that in several of the cases in which instructions or 
special questions caused problems, the jurors were aware of a problem and sought clarification by 
questioning the judge, but the judge usually provided no specific help, instead calling the jury's 
attention to all or a portion of  the instructions that the jury had previously been given. 
A second difficulty which the jurors had in some cases was difficulty in understanding 
esoteric facts when expert testimony seemed on its face equally credible and conflicting. But this 
too is a problem found in cases that are not generally thought of a s  complex since it appears 
associated with a conflict of experts and not with other features that make a case complex. For 
example, when Goodman, ~ r e e n e  and Loftus (1985) questioned trial court judges about the 
difficulties that jurors had in complex cases, comprehension of medical testimony and the . 
evaluation of damages in complex personal injury cases emerged as  recurrent problems, 
particularly in situations when jurors were faced with "reconciling totally conflicting expert 
testimony from highly qualified medical witnesses" (Goodman et  al., 1985, a t  66). But this kind 
of conflict can occur in what are otherwise run of the mill tort cases, the routine fodder of the civil 
jury (Gross, 1992). Ironically, conflicting expert testimony, which juries are not well-equipped to 
deal with, will often not make a jury's verdict appear irrational since a decision for either party 
when experts cannot agree will often appear reasonable. Thus in W.R. Grace, regardless of how 
the jury decided the contamination issue an observer cannot conclude that  the jury was mistaken 
on the evidence, and the situation is similar with respect to the jury's finding in Johns Manville 
that. each of the plaintiffs was suffering from asbestosis. The situation is perhaps best captured 
by the words of a juror discussing conflicting medical testimony in another asbestos case: "the 
expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in the very backhanded sense that  i t  
lent medical credence to any result" (Goodman e t  al., 1985 a t  68). Problems attributable to 
misunderstanding do arise and the jury can be wrong when it credits less reliable expert testimony 
over more reliable testimony. At its extreme, this is the so-called "junk science" problem (Huber, 
1991). In none of the cases noted in Table One did the jury seem to prefer less credible scientific 
evidence over more credible evidence. In the Pennzoil case, however, the jury on the liability issue 
accepted what appears to be an unrealistic view of how the business world viewed an  "agreement 
in principle" to consummate a multibillion dollar merger. 
The jury's action in Pennzoil, however, brings us to the second factor by my reading of the 
case studies is particularly salient when juries go astray in complex litigation: the mistakes of 
lawyers and judges. In Texaco, the judge, "with some exceptions ... didn't permit the lawyer- 
witnesses to testify on their understanding of the term "'agreement in principle"' (Adler, 1986; 30) 
and Texaco did not produce any expert witness to make the point that  an  agreement in principle is 
understood not to be binding. Thus, the jury's mistaken perspective on this issue is plausibly 
attributable to the rational weighing of the evidence they heard (Shannon, 1988) rather than to a 
failure to comprehend or appreciate evidence set before them. Other judicial mistakes, both in 
formulating instructions and ruling on evidentiary matters, have been noted in discussing the 
Table One case studies and shall not be repeated here. 
Lawyer mistakes, including strategic and legal errors, have also been noted in our 
discussion of particular cases. There is, however, a more general observation that  I wish to make. 
Very often, i t  appears that  lawyer mistakes stem from underestimating the capacity of the jury. 
Thus, in three cases (MicroNest, Pennzoil, & Johns Manville) lawyers did not produce important 
evidence on damages, probably because they feared that  to do so would concede a liability issue 
they were contesting. l4 In other cases we learn from juror comments that  attempts to appeal to 
them through ploys that  appeal to emotions are sometimes perceived for what they are, and when 
this occurs they may backfire. Thus in the ABA trade secrets case the jurors were notably 
unimpressed by the cross-defendant's suggestion that  a verdict for the cross-plaintiffs might cost 
138 New Yorkers their jobs; in Johns Manville the jurors were scornful of the lead plaintiffs 
wife's reference to the fact that  the next day was her 45th wedding anniversary, and the 
defendant's attempt in MicroNest to show the humble backgrounds of their client may well have 
backfired a s  well. As one juror in MicroNest commented: "The whole case was on the contract, 
but they kept going back to what he (Millard) did as  a child: selling newspapers and such. When 
you hear seven times what school someone went to, i t  gets a little old. They got away from what 
they were really there for" (Weinstein, 1983, 127). 
There appear to be more arguably mistaken verdicts in this set  of complex cases than one 
would expect to find in an equivalent number of simpler cases. Given the non-random nature of 
the sample and the number of celebrated cases, it is impossible to say whether judges and lawyers 
are more likely to err  in complex cases than in simpler ones, but it is certainly reasonable to think 
so. Also i t  may be that  such mistakes are more consequential in complex cases than simple ones, 
for when cases are complex juries may be more susceptible to being misled by error. Had the 
Texaco case been simpler, for example, the jury might not have needed opposing evidence to 
appreciate the unreasonableness of Pennzoil's demand. Thus complexity may pose special 
difficulties for juries in part, or in large measure, because of the special difficulties it poses for 
judges and counsel. As most judges and lawyers realize, complexity is a sign that  special care 
must be taken. 
l4 The fear is not irrational. Haney (1984) has shown that  jurors who have observed the death 
qualification process have attitudes toward the case more consistent with a willingness to convict 
than the attitudes of those who have not witnessed the death qualification process. It seems that  
a t  least part  of the explanation for this is that  the jurors assume that unless the judge and 
lawyers thought the defendant was guilty of a capital offense, there would be no death 
qualification. A defense counsel might similarly fear that  a jury would regard the presence of 
evidence contesting damages as  an  acknowledgement tha t  the plaintiff's position on liability 
deserved to prevail. Nevertheless such a n  attitude on the part of jurors would be only one factor 
that  would affect their weighing of the evidence on liability, and it is unlikely to matter a s  much 
as evidence more directly related to liability. On the other hand the potential costs of not 
presenting a witness to tell the jury that  the asbestosis of three plaintiffs, if that  is what they 
have, is unlikely to become a s  debilitating as  it is in the case of an incapacitated plaintiff before 
them (Johns Manville) or of not showing the jury that  if the plaintiff was damaged a t  all the 
damages are  closer to $400 million than to $7.53 billion (Pennzoil) are so substantial that  a n  
attorney who opts for the strategic withholding of damage evidence is acting foolishly. 

In Sum 
To sum up, one must be wary of drawing firm conclusions from a non-random sample of 
cases studies. This is clearly true here, particularly since half the stgdies I cite were done by 
journalists not specially concerned with showing how juries deal with complexity a s  a general 
matter. However, some tentative conclusions appear reasonable. First, it is clear that  juries 
confronted with technical information do have problems understanding, and if there is conflicting 
expert testimony jurors may have the feeling that they do not know whom to believe. Second, 
juries often seem able to decide their way .around such confusion and arrive a t  appropriate 
verdicts. Third, where juries make mistakes in deciding complex cases, the mistakes seem more 
often due to mistakes in understanding judicial instructions or to the errors of the judge or lawyers 
than they are to the difficulty of understanding the implications of complex or massive amounts of 
evidence. I t  is possible that  complexitj~ exacerbates the jury's difficulties with instructions or the 
degree to which juries are likely to be misled by the mistakes of others, but one cannot reach this 
conclusion on the basis of the case descriptions we have reviewed. Overall. one can say that  the 
sample of cases I have examined provide no empirical support for the claim that  there is a denial 
~f the due process r i ~ h t  to a rational decision on the evidence when iuries are seated in complex 
civil cases. The failure to find a clear link between complexity and a denial of due process is 
consistent with aggregated data collected by Heuer and Penrod (no date). They report that  in 160 
federal cases collected so as  to oversample complex ones, judges were no more likely to disagree 
with jury verdicts in complex cases than they were in cases that  were shorter or simpler on the 
law or facts. 
Laboratorv Research 
Turning from case studies to the psychologist's laboratory, we find either more relevant 
studies than we can deal with or very little. There a re  more studies than we can deal with in the 
sense that  most studies that  bear on the quality of jury fact finding and the influence of particular 
variables should apply to juries in complex cases in the same way that  they apply to juries in 
simpler cases. There is very little that  is relevant in the sense that  there are few studies that  use 
as stimuli the factual settings of complex cases or that  seek to pose for mock jurors the kinds of 
special problems that  are  associated with complex cases. To keep things manageable it is only the 
latter group of studies that  I shall review here. 
Before I do, a word about external validity is in order. For obvious reasons, there are no 
studies that  expose mock jurors to the trial lengths or masses of evidence that  are common in 
complex litigation. This, however, may not be as great  a threat  to our ability to generalize 
controlled experiments as one might assume since it appears from the case studies that  trial 
length and massive arrays of evidence are not the most important sources of the special 
difficulties that  jurors may encounter in complex litigation. However, one cannot assume that  
trial length and the amount of evidence in a case do not matter. Even if the difference between a 
taped trial of two to four hours and a trial of a few days does not shake our confidence in our 
ability to generalize from experimental findings to juror performance in ordinary cases - and the 
evidence indicates that  i t  should not - the difference between a taped trial of the same length and 
a n  actual trial of six weeks to six months may mean tha t  what we learn from a simulation is an 
unreliable guide to the way an actual jury would act after a lengthy trial. We do not know what 
weight to give this concern. With stimuli less rich than the taped trial, external validity concerns 
loom even larger. At the same time, before criticizing a study for not mimicking real life 
situations, one must consider the point the study is designed to reveal and the justification for 
generalizing from it. Realism is not always necessary to generalization. 
Statistics 
The first set  of psychological studies of potential relevance to the special problems that  
confront jurors in complex cases concerns the way that  jurors deal with statistics. Statistical 
evidence is often found in complex litigation, and people without statistical training frequently find 
statistics evidence hard to understand. Several researchers have looked a t  what mock jurors do 
when confronted with statistical evidence (Thompson, 1989). Thompson and Schumann identify 
(1987) two fallacies that  jurors can fall into when confronted with incidence rate statistics such as  
blood type evidence that  links a defendant to a crime. One, which they call the "prosecutor's 
fallacy", is to think that  the probability of a defendant's guilt can be determined by subtracting the 
incidence rate of a matching characteristic from one. l5 The other, which they call the "defense 
attorney's fallacy" is to treat incidence evidence a s  irrelevant almost regardless of the rarity of the 
matching characteristic because a t  most it shows the defendant falls into a larger group, one of 
whom is guilty.16 
Thus, if the defendant has the same blood type a s  the perpetrator of the charged crime and 
that  blood type is found in 10% of the population a juror caught in the prosecutor's fallacy would 
conclude that  since there is a 10% probability that  the defendant would have the blood type if he 
were innocent there must be a 90% chance that  the defendant is guilty. 
l6 Thus if the defendant and perpetrator share a blood type shared by 1% of the population, one 
who falls prey to the defense attorney's fallacy would reason that  in a city of 1,000,000 people 
there are probably 10,000 people who share the blood type in question so the evidence has almost 
no incriminatory value. 
In an experiment with student subjects Thompson and Schumann found that  when 
presented with evidence relating to the probability of a hair match about 25% of their subjects fell 
into one error or the other, and they were about equally divided between the two types of errors. 
On a jury, particularly a twelve person jury, such error rates would not be of great concern 
because i t  is likely that  there would be people present who understood how the evidence should be 
weighted and that  these jurors could explain the weaknesses of the fallacious approaches. Indeed, 
even if only people making the two types of errors were present on the jury, discussion might 
reveal why neither position was correct. 1n a second experiment, however, subjects heard 
advocates arguing for interpretations of blood type evidence consistent with either the prosecutor's 
or the defense attorney's fallacy. In  these circumstances, only 22% of the subjects rejected both 
arguments, and one would expect actual jurors, most of whom do not have a college education, to 
do worse in dealing with such statistical arguments than college students serving a s  experimental 
subjects. 
The relationship between falling prey to a fallacy and reaching an  incorrect decision is, 
however, not clear. This is the somewhat ironic lesson of another study by Schumann and 
Thompson (1989, described in Thompson, 1989). In  this study mock jurors watched a relatively 
realistic trial simulation which consisted of a four hour videotape. The closing arguments they 
observed either ignored the blood type evidence, included a fallacious prosecution argument, 
included a fallacious defense argument or included competing fallacious arguments. Only the 
argument for the prosecutor's fallacy when presented alone had an effect; i t  increased the 
conviction rate from about 50 to 70 per cent and the average estimated probability of guilt to 85%. 
In the other conditions both the conviction rates and the average probability of guilt estimates fell. 
The irony is that  given the probability of guilt a s  estimated by control subjects who received no 
blood type evidence, the blood type evidence should have increased the average probability of guilt 
to above .90. Only those subjects who fell victim to the prosecutor's fallacy were close! 
The tendency of Schumann and Thompson's subjects to underestimate the probative 
weight of statistical evidence is not surprising. There are  good theoretical reasons for expecting 
statistical evidence to be less influential with fact finders than intrinsically less probative non- 
statistical evidence (Saks and Kidd, 1980), and other researchers have also found evidence about 
the statistical incidence of matching blood types to be relatively uninfluential, even when expert 
statistical testimony is presented explaining its implications (Faigman and Baglioni, 1988). 
It may well be that  some complex cases involve incidence statistics of the type that  
Thompson and Schumann and others have investigated or even that  cases that  contain such 
statistics should be considered complex regardless of their other characteristics; however, the 
statistics that  are involved in most cases conventionally considered complex are somewhat 
different in nature. They usually consist, a s  in toxic tort  cases, of epidemiological statistics which 
turn on comparisons between exposed and unexposed populations, or, as in many anti-trust and 
most sex-discrimination law suits, they are the statistics associated with regression analyses. I 
have been able to find only two studies that  deal with such statistics. 
Molly Treadway (1990) has explored the adequacy of juror intuitions when confronted with 
the kinds of four-fold relative risk tables that  epidemiologists use to determine whether a 
particular condition causes a particular disease. She found that  the intuitions of 25 subjects who 
were members of the Baltimore city jury pool were not good. Her subjects were asked to examine 
two tables, one of which showed a relative risk from exposure of 2.8 and the other of which a 
relative risk of 1.01, and to determine from each table (1) whether exposure to a substance 
increased a person's risk of developing an  abnormality and (2), for any particular person exposed 
to the substance who had the abnormality, whether it was  more likely than not that  the substance 
rather than something else had caused the abnormality. Only 41% of the determinations accorded 
with the answers reached through epidemiological analysis, and only 2 persons, or 8% of the 
respondents, made all four determinations in accordance with epidemiological reasoning. These 
results are  not encouraging, but they do not adequately address the issue that  concerns us. The 
reason for their inadequacy is that  in litigation jurors a re  not confronted with relative risk tables 
and asked for their best interpretation. Rather the tables are presented by experts who explain 
what they imply. One would expect instructed jurors to do far better in understanding the 
implications of the data presented to them than jurors not so instructed. 
Shari Diamond and J a y  Casper (In Press), in a particularly good simulation study, exposed 
1022 Cook County jurors to a n  hour and fifteen minute videotape of the damage portion of a suit 
brought under the Sherman Act. (The jurors were informed that  in the first phase of the trial the 
defendants had been found to have engaged in illegal price-fixing.) As one aspect of this research, 
they explored the reactions of jurors to competing yardstick and statistical models, two common 
types of models used to establish damages in such cases.17 In the various conditions of the 
l7 Yardstick models are non-statistical. They employ comparative data from similar firms which 
did business in competitive markets at the time of the defendant's anticompetitive activity and are 
based on the premise that  the difference in prices paid or profits made by the benchmark firms 
and the plaintiff is a good measure of the excess costs imposed on or profits lost by the plaintiff 
company. While valid comparisons are difficult to obtain, the approach is the kind of concrete, 
common sense approach that  one would expect a jury to intuitively understand and easily 
appreciate. Regression models involve time series analyses of pricing patterns before, during and 
sometimes after the price-fixing agreement. The model used in the experiment involved a 
statistical projection, based on pre-price-fixing performance, of what the price the plaintiff paid 
would have been had there not been a price-fixing agreement. Jurors are not accustomed to 
dealing with regression models and one would expect tha t  they would find statistical modeling 
difficult to understand. 
The other aspect of this study, which I shall not discuss, concerned the implications of 
informing jurors that  awards in suits brought under the Sherman Act are trebled. 
experiment, the models were counterbalanced by party and the amount of damages they implied. 
The jurors returned individual verdicts following their exposure to the case, and then deliberated 
in 70 six-person juries until verdicts were returned. 
The authors did not find that  their statistical expert was ignored or that  the effects of his 
testimony were dwarfed by the effects of the more concrete yardstick testimony. Overall jurors 
gave somewhat higher awards ($216,515 versus $200,813) when the plaintiffs expert presented 
a statistical model than when he used a yardstick comparison, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. l8 The overall influence of the statistical evidence relative to the yardstick 
evidence' appeared to be the result of two competing forces: the statistical expert was seen as more 
expert than the expert presenting the yardstick model and this made him more convincing, but the 
statistical expert's testimony was seen as  less clear than the testimony presented by the yardstick 
expert and this made him less convincing.19 .For those jurors who found the statistical testimony 
to be similar to the yardstick testimony in clarity, there was a statistically significant difference in 
awards. When the statistical expert testified for the plaintiff, -the mean award was $220,517; it 
was $168,223 when he testified for the defendant. 
The deliberation process had a marked effect on damage awards, a s  the juries' verdicts 
averaged about 27% higher than the average of their members' predeliberation judgments. This 
was not due to the effect of outliers, for the correlation across juries of outlier preferences with 
final verdicts was relatively low while the correlation with each group's mean and median 
predeliberation preferences was strong. 20 Among jurors the foreperson's preferences were 
particularly i n f l ~ e n t i a l . ~ ~  This is important when we recall from the case studies that  juries seem 
to be most influenced by their most capable members and we note the tendency.for juries to select 
particularly capable members a s  forepersons. For example, in the Diamond and Casper study the 
13% of the jurors in the pool who had had both some postgraduate education and a statistics 
18 Whether he offered a statistical model or a yardstick model the plaintiffs expert presented 
data that  suggested the plaintiffs damages had amounted to $490,000 while conceding that  they 
might be as  low as $420,000. The defendant's expert, regardless of the model used, presented 
data which suggested that  the most likely figure for damages was $35,000 but conceded that  the 
model could not rule out damages of up to $105,000. 
19 There was no statistically significant difference in the ratings given the experts on 
persuasiveness or trustworthiness. 
20 The correlation between the juries' mean predeliberation awards and their final verdicts was 
.54; for median predeliberation awards it was .62; for a jury's highest predeliberation award it 
was .24, and for the lowest predeliberation award it was .20. 
21 The correlation between foreperson's pre-deliberation awards and final jury awards was .44 
across jury verdicts while the correlation of final verdicts with the awards of non-forepersons was 
.22. 
course accounted for 36% of those persons chosen foreperson. Moreover, the predeliberation 
preferences of forepersons with both these characteristics had considerably more influence on final 
verdicts than the preferences of forepersons who had neither postgraduate education nor a course 
i~  statistic^.^^ These findings should caution researchers about generalizing from the average 
individual response to statistical evidence to the response of juries, and they emphasize the way in 
which the composition of real juries in actual cases may affect how complex evidence influences 
deliberations. 23 
Overall Diamond and Casper provide the most resounding support for the capacities of 
juries dealing with complex issues that  can be found in the scientific literature. They write: 
The responses to expert testimony we observe ... suggest that  jurors play an  active 
role in assimilating and assessing testimony. Jurors  did not simply adopt the view 
of a witness they rated high on expertise, using a parent expertise a s  a peripheral 
cue to conclude that  the expert must be correct.28 Rather, consistent with deeper 
processing of information which produces attitude change when the listener is . 
highly involved, the jurors appeared to consider and evaluate the content of what 
the expert was presenting, and were less likely to be persuaded if they did not feel 
they understood it. 
This approach not only suggests an activity and perhaps even subtlety in dealing 
with expert testimony, but i t  also indicates the care jurors use in evaluating 
evidence to reach their decisions. Rather than being bowled over by what they did 
22 The correlation between foreperson's preferences and final jury verdicts is .57 for the former 
group and .36 for the latter. 
23 The contrary implication that  one may draw from the Schumann and Thompson (1989) study 
may be due to the fact that their simulated jurors were a relatively homogenous group or that 
they had few subjects who had studied statistics. Thompson's (1989) description of that study, on 
which I have relied, does not describe the demographics of their simulated jurors. 
24 The possibility that  jurors when faced with a conflict of experts simply endorse the views of 
one of them is a suggestion made by Raitz e t  al. (1990) who looked a t  the implications of expert 
economics testimony in a mock age discrimination case. However a s  a general matter the Raitz e t  
a1 findings simply do not hold up in the face of the methodologically superior work of Diamond and 
Casper. Raitz and his coauthors presented subjects with a 150 word summary of a trial and a 
200 word "transcript" of testimony relating to damages in their "no expert" condition. The 
"plaintiffs expert only" condition added 200 words and included the examination and cross- 
examination of the plaintiffs expert, while the two expert condition added an additional 400 words 
and the examination and cross-examination of a defense economics expert. 
One cannot, however, on the basis of the Diamond and Casper work rule out the possibility 
that  jurors use an  "endorsement strategy" when conflicting experts use the same methodology, 
although the W.H. Grace case shows jurors reacting in the opposite way by acknowledging they 
are unable to decide. Nor is there necessarily anything wrong with a n  endorsement approach if 
the endorsement is based on a reasonable assessment of the credibility of the opposing experts as 
may have occurred in Johns Manville. Also, if only one side presents expert evidence, 
endorsement of the expert's views may be a natural response as  seems to have occurred in 
Pennzoil. . 
not understand, the persuasive force of statistical testimony appears to depend in 
some substantial measure on the ability of the experts to express clearly the basis 
for the conclusions it is being used to support. Our results also suggest that 
concerns.about jurors' susceptibility to statistical evidence may be overstated. 
Of course, external validity concerns may limit the real world implications Diamond and 
Casper research. I t  may be difficult to make statistical evidence clear when it is embedded in 
weeks of other evidence, or, more importantly given our earlier tentative conclusion that length 
alone is not a substantial problem, when the statistical testimony itself takes hours to deliver, 
when it is followed by a cross-examination that may take days, when there is competing statistical 
testimony of a similar type, when one side is using its experts to obfuscate and when peremptory 
challenges have been used to strike jurors who know too much about statistics. But even in a 
worst case scenario where these concerns correctly identify the reality of much modern complex 
litigation, it may still be reasonable to draw from Diamond and Casper the conclusion that jury 
weaknesses in dealing with the kinds of statistical evidence most commonly associated with 
complex litigation are not inherent in the institution of the civil jury but are the result of the way 
in which complex jury trials are managed. 
Joinder 
A second body of laboratory studies that may have special relevance to the question of how 
well we can expect juries to perform in complex cases are those that focus on joinder. These 
studies matter because one factor that may make for complexity is the joining of parties or counts, 
as  in Johns Manville which involved four bellwether plaintiffs - who if they were not part of a 
"case congregation" would have enjoyed separate trials - and ten defendants, some of whom 
might not have been involved in a t  least some of the separate suits that the plaintiffs might have 
brought as  individuals. 
Joinder can involve parties, causes of action (counts or charges) or both. Most of the 
research on joinder in the psychological literature involves the joinder of charges in criminal cases 
that would not be considered complex.(see e.g. Greene and Loftus, 1985; Tanford et al., 1985) 
Bordens and Horowitz (1985) provide a review of this research. Generally the research shows 
that a criminal defendant is disadvantaged when charges are joinder, but the mechanism by which 
this occurs is unclear. Three possible mechanisms are: confusion of the evidence, so that evidence 
admitted on one charge is remembered as  bearing on another charge; accumulation of evidence 
across charges, so that evidence admitted on one charge reinforces evidence relevant to another 
charge, and inferences about the defendant's character, so that the jury characterizes the 
defendant with a criminal schema and views the evidence on each charge in that light. The 
studies designed to elucidate which if any of these mechanisms operate are often limited in their 
focus and yield inconsistent results. 
These mechanisms might all operate in civil cases in which different causes of action are 
combined, but if they do it is not clear that they should systematically disadvantage one party or 
the other. In the studies dealing with charge joinder there is always incriminatory evidence that 
. . implicates the defendant. In the civil cases, on the other hand, a plaintiff may introduce evidence 
on several counts which suggests the defendant was responsible for her injuries, but the defendant 
may offer evidence on the same counts which suggests that the harm the plaintiff suffered was 
her own fault. Also unlike those cases of criminal joinder that have been the subject of 
psychological research, the crucial evidence offered on one civil count may be admissible on 
another, as when a jury is charged with deciding whether a defendant is responsible under either 
a negligence or strict liability theory. 
To the extent that evidence in a civil case is admissible on only one count, as when 
evidence of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is admissible to rebut negligence liability but not 
strict liability, a jury's failure to apply instructions to limit the influence of the evidence to the one 
count would not be surprising (Hans and Doob, 1976; Kassin and Wrightsman, 1981; Wissler and 
Saks, 1985; Casper et  al., 1989), but the difficulties posed by the added counts are not specific to , 
complex litigation. If, however, the presence of alternate causes of action means that considerably 
more evidence is presented than when only a single cause of action is alleged and that the trial 
lasts much longer as  a consequence, one might point to alternate causes of action as  creating 
complexity apart from the danger of legal or evidential confusion. But alternate causes of action 
are not usually regarded as  substantially lengthening trials, and no investigation of the effects of 
alternate causes of action has tried to simulate what would otherwise be considered a complex 
case. Instead, it is party joinder that is usually seen a s  making potentially simple cases complex. 
Trying the cases of different parties together can involve numerous lawyers, often dramatically 
increases the amount of relevant evidence, and requires the jury to link different items of evidence 
to the cases of one or more of the parties before it. 
Horowitz and Bordens (1988) have attempted to study the effects of party joinder in a 
simulated complex case. They used a s  a stimulus a four hour audio tape of a toxic tort trial in 
which the evidence was intentionally complicated and a t  times boring. Subjects were 396 jury- 
eligible men and women who deliberated in 66 six-person juries. The case involved a large 
chemical company that had allegedly leaked effluent that entered the food chain and harmed the 
plaintiffs. Litigating the plaintiffs' claims raised both negligence and state of the ar t  issues. The ' 
basic comparison was between verdicts when four plaintiffs were tried together and verdicts in the 
four cases when the trials were disaggregated. Within these conditions, an additional variation 
contrasted a situation in which plaintiff A was an outlier with respect to the seriousness of her 
injury (suffering from a rare liver cancer) with a situation where she was not (suffering from 
chloracne rather than cancer). The final variable was whether the jurors were told there were 26 
or "many hundreds" of other victims or whether the existence of other victims was not mentioned. 
Overall the data do not suggest that  the aggregation of plaintiffs led to confusion. Only 
the plaintiff with the weakest case, a man who may have continued to e a t  fish after knowing the 
food chain was contaminated, was helped by having his case aggregated with the others, and this 
effect may reflect rational information processing. If the question of whether the plaintiff was 
responsible for his illness was a close one, the fact that  people who clearly weren't responsible for 
their condition suffered from the contamination is some reason to believe that  the plaintiffs 
suffering was not his fault. Also the data show that compensatory damages were not affected, a s  
they should not be, by the presence of an  outlier or the number of other victims; that  the greater 
the responsibility attributed to the defendant the higher the awards, and that  the earlier the date 
that  the jurors thought the defendant should have known about the toxicity of the chemical it was 
discharging the higher the awards. Where liability was found, punitive damages were greater if 
a n  outlier was part  of the aggregate and if there were hundreds of other victims. These latter 
results also appear reasonable since punitive damages should reflect the amount and extent of the 
harm a wrongdoer does. 
Two potentially disquieting notes in the study are  first a finding that  the presence of an 
outlier is associated with a higher proportion of no liability findings and second that  there is 
substantial variance across juries in their verdicts. The effect of the outlier in stimulating no 
liability findings is associated in the taped deliberations with remarks attributing fault to the 
outlier. This appears to be a classic "just world" response (Lerner, 1 9 8 0 ) . ~ 5  The fact that  the 
three juries that  blamed the outlier in this way also denied recovery to her co-plaintiffs probably 
reflects the fact that  evidence linking the defendant to the co-plaintiffs injuries was arguably no 
stronger, and in one case was clearly weaker, than the evidence linking the defendant to the 
outlier's injuries. As for the variance in jury verdicts and awards, that  may be simply a fact of 
life that  is not peculiar to jury trials (Diamond, 1983). As the authors point out similar 
inconsistencies have been found in judicial behavior when matters such as sentencing have been 
examined, and in a recent study by Rice and Vidmar (1992) suggests tha t  in medical malpractice 
cases jury verdicts are no less consistent than arbitrators' awards. Moreover, much of the 
inconsistency in liability verdicts is attributable to those cases where the irrationality of just world 
thinking appears to be operating. Inconsistent damage awards may in large measure reflect the 
25 Researchers who have investigated the "just world" paradigm report that  the greater the 
harm suffered by a victim the greater the tendency to blame the victim. This is attributed to a 
psychological need to feel in control which is undermined if people are seen to be suffering 
excessively through no fault of their own. 
fact that  the plaintiffs did not request specific amounts of money, so the juries did not have the 
kinds of anchors and supporting evidence that actual juries often have a t  trials.26 Whatever else 
is happening, the jurors seem not to be misled by the additional complexity of dealing with four 
plaintiffs rather than one.27 
In Sum 
Looking at the joinder studies together with the studies on how juries use statistical 
evidence, we can see a number of places where they highlight potential problems posed by the 
26 The authors make this point in a later article reporting another experiment that  draws on the 
same stimulus tape (See the note that  follows); I assume i t  applies to this study as  well. 
27 In a later article using the same stimulus tape the authors investigated the effect of 
bifurcating and trifurcating trials on damage awards. (Horowitz and Bordens, 1990) While the 
article is important for those interested in how juries deal with complex cases because i t  studies a 
variation that  exists in such cases and suggests that  the decision to bifurcate or trifurcate a 
verdict can have substantial consequences, it adds little to what the first study suggest about the 
jury's capacity to handle complex litigation. Assuming that  the jury's task is easier when it hears 
evidence on one issue and then decides that issue than when it hears evidence on all issues 
together and decides the issues seriatim, the study does not suggest that  juries do worse when 
their task is more complex. First, there is no a priori reason to suppose that one pattern of 
verdicts represents a more rational outcome than another pattern. To the extent that  verdict 
consistency across juries is such a standard, there is more verdict consistency in the unitary trials. 
To the extent a normative judgment is possible, the verdicts of the unitary juries appear more 
normative, for they are more likely to find for the plaintiffs on the liability issue, and an  expert 
panel of two law professors and a lawyer who reviewed the evidence thought the liability evidence 
favored the plaintiff. Second, when a trial only lasts four hours, even if some evidence is complex 
and boring, there may be little in the way of simplifying to be accomplished by presenting evidence 
only on one issue. Indeed, the longer trial may present a simpler decision problem if evidence 
allocated to one issue has some relevance on another, for additional evidence may make a case 
less close and a decision easier rather than harder. An overlap in the implications of evidence 
may be one reason why Horowitz and Bordens' unitary juries were more consistent with each 
other and more pro plaintiff in deciding the issue of causality. The causality evidence was the 
only evidence subset that  the expert panel saw as ambiguous rather than pro plaintiff. Perhaps 
when the implications of other evidence for causality were considered the task of deciding the 
causality issue became simpler and that  this led to greater consistency. Alternatively, one might 
agree that  sympathy or other factors that should not affect decisions on causality motivated pro- 
plaintiff decisions on this issue. But sympathy at least does not seem to motivate the unitary 
jurors in this study, for sympathy should be a response to the plaintiffs damage claim and 
separated juries which heard liability evidence first, rendered a verdict, and then heard causal but 
not damage evidence had a verdict pattern much like tha t  rendered by the unitary jury deciding 
the liability and causal issues in the same order. It is possible that in both cases the causal 
decision reflects a desire to punish the defendant, but i t  is at least as plausible to suppose that  the 
causal link between the presence of a chemical and the illness of a plaintiff becomes more likely 
when one knows that  a defendant has been discharging the chemical where the plaintiff can 
encounter it. One other observation of the authors that  bears on the rationality of the juries they 
studied is that  once a jury decided for a side, intrajury verdict consistency was "remarkable." 
irrationality of some human decision making. But if we look a t  these studies for indicators of 
whether juries are likely to be less competent in complex cases than in other cases, we do not see 
any. Indeed, in the more realistic studies, those by Diamond and Casper on statistical evidence 
and Horowitz and Bordens on joinder, we see juries coping rather well with those features that 
make the decision making tasks posed by the stimulus cases more complex than the decision 
making tasks that juries encounter in more ordinary litigation. 
JUDGES AND COMPLEX CASES 
Even if the jury were substantially less able to deal with complexity than it apparently is, 
due process, 1 have argued should not require the abrogation of the Seventh Amendment right to 
trial by jury unless judges can decide complex cases more rationally than juries can. If there is 
little systematic empirical evidence that relates to the competence of the jury in complex litigation, 
there is virtually none in the case of the judge. Judges have not cooperated in studies of 
themselves as they proceeded to decide complex cases, they seldom participate as  subjects in 
simulation studies and have not done so in studies simulating complex litigation, and they seldom 
grant interviews in which they explain how they understood the evidence in complex cases. They 
do write opinions, but their opinions may provide little insight into the true bases of their 
decisions. Even where an opinion suggests a mastery of complex materials, the reader cannot 
know whether the judge has understood the subject, whether he or she &a reaching a decision 
relied on a clerk to convey an impression of understanding or whether the judge and/or the clerk 
simply copied large passages from the briefs of the side which they favored. Thus, the evidence 
on how judges handle complexity is fragmentary, and no overall judgment can be reached. What 
we can say is that there is no guarantee that the judge can do a better job than the jury; that 
there are a number of cases in which we would not want to force the parties to a bench trial, and 
that when the judge is unbiased and capable parties may be particularly likely to opt for a bench 
trial, but if they don't there is a better than average chance that the jury will be up to its task. 
The Link Between Judicial and Jurv Competence 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the case studies we have examined. Recall that in 
almost every instance where a jury verdict was seen to be of low or moderate defensibility those 
who reported on the trials noted mistakes made by the lawyers and/or the judge. Conversely in 
those trials where the jury seemed to perform a t  its best, like the DeLorean trial, the judge 
seemed to have performed exceptionally well also. This has the ironic implication that were there 
a n  exception to the Seventh Amendment for complexity, it is likely that  the judge would perform 
best in precisely those trials where the jury is likely to do a good job a s  well, for competent judges 
can enhance the competence of juries they preside over. Thus to the extent that  the case fnr a 
judge trial turns on the assumption of a competent judge, we are assuming the kind of judge most 
likely to preside over a competent jury. 
The apparent link between judicial and jury competence means that  if we look a t  cases 
where juries are confused or err, there is an  above average chance that  we will find a judge who is 
confused or mistaken a s  well. It is not, however, necessarily the case that  a judge who gives a 
jury poor guidance will perform equally poorly as  a fact finder. A judge who confuses the jury 
with a n  unclear instruction might correctly interpret the law as  a trier of fact, or a judge whose 
questionable evidentiary rulings have prejudiced one side's case before the jury, might nonetheless 
find for that side, perhaps influenced by the very evidence that  he wrongfully excluded and the 
jury will not hear. But by the same token judicial mistakes may signal more general failings, and 
a jury, even one hampered by judicial mistakes, may be better a t  fact finding than a judge who 
cannot adequately organize a trial or state a rule of law. Indeed, in some cases the jury's strength 
of numbers and experience may make it more able in finding facts than even an  excellent judge 
(Lempert, 1975). 
Anecdotal Evidence of Judicial Failings 
We have no systematic evidence on the capacity of judges to deal with the kinds of 
evidence that  make complex cases difficult, but anecdotal evidence of situations in which judges 
appear not to have fully comprehended scientific evidence is easy to find. To begin a t  the top, we 
have the example of the Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.78 (1970), 
which took the results of Asch's line experiments to mean the opposite of what they implied 
(Lempert, 1975). -At  the opposite end of the judicial hierarchy, Saks and Van Duizend (1983), 
who read transcripts of a homicide case that  raised definition of death problems, concluded that  
the prosecution was not a s  conversant with the medical facts a s  the defense. Yet the judge, whom 
they interviewed, praised the prosecutor's preparation and was unimpressed by the defense. 
Statistical evidence seems to present courts with recurring problems. Sometimes courts 
are too ready to receive statistical evidence not realizing its unreliability (e.g. People v. Collins 
438 P.2d.33 (1968)). On other occasions courts are too reluctant to hear statistical evidence that  
is essential to understanding the facts before it. In Minnesota, for example, the state legislature 
had to pass a statute to overturn a Minnesota state supreme court ruling that  statistical evidence 
relating to DNA matches was inadmissible even though such information is essential to estimate 
the probative value of a DNA match (State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W. 422 (Minn., 1989)). Some 
years before in the same state, a trial court made the opposite error. It admitted misleading 
statistical evidence based on an  inadequate scientific foundation to show the probative value.of a 
hair match and a man was convicted and sentenced to prison for life perhaps because of it. 
v. Carlson, 267 N.W. 2d 170 (Minn., 1978)) Both a Federal District Court (U.S. v. Massey, 594 
F 2d 676, (8th Cir. 1979)) and an  Illinois Trial Court (U.S. ex Rel. Di Giacomo v. Franzen, 680 F 
2d 515 (7th Cir. ,1982)) made the same error (Fienberg, 1989, 60-67). Other cases in which trial 
and appellate courts have had varying degrees of difficulty in correctly interpreting statistical 
evidence are documented by the National Research Council in a report i t  prepared on statistical 
evidence in courts (Fienberg, 1989). 
The recent controversy over DNA evidence also reveals the difficulty that  judges can have 
with scientific information. While one would expect rational decision makers to reach the same 
conclusions on the same evidence, court decisions on the admissibility of DNA evidence have 
differed though the evidence bearing on admissibility was similar. Indeed, in one case a court that  
refused to admit DNA evidence relied heavily on briefs that  had been offered in a case that  
accepted it. (Compare United% 129 FRD 692 (N.D. Ohio, 1990) with Sta'te v. 
Despain, Superior Court of the State of Arizona in the County of Yuma, No. 15589, Feb. 12, 
1991.) Finally one occasionally encounters cases where judges admit that  scientific evidence is 
beyond them. (See e.g,, Ethvl Corp. v. Environmental Protection A~encv,  541 F.2d. 1, 67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976);  478 F. 2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 
19731.128 
The point of all this is not to establish the general inability of judges to cope with scientific 
evidence. The available anecdotal evidence does not allow us to reach any conclusion about the 
seriousness of the problems that  judges face in dealing with the kinds of evidence that  make cases 
complex or about the abilities of our nation's judges to understand and correctly decide complex 
cases. Nor do we even know, except in the rare case, how judges go about deciding the factual 
issues in complex cases. However, the anecdotal evidence does mean that  just as there are no 
guarantees that  juries will understand technical evidence in a complex case or decide correctly 
where such understanding is required, so are there no guarantees that  judges will get everything 
right. Nor do we have any empirical basis for deciding whether judges will in some statistical 
sense decide complex cases better than juries do over the long run. The best evidence we have on 
28 Many of these examples come from appellate courts whose errors and bewilderment is more 
accessible because their opinions are generally published and they cannot disguise their difficulties 
by simply finding facts without describing the basis of their reasoning. While there is some reason 
to believe that  trial judges are structurally better able than appellate judges to gain an 
understanding of difficult scientific facts (Lempert, 1988), there is no reason to believe that their 
structural advantages eliminate problems of understanding, and as  individuals it is likely that 
most appellate judges are more capable than most of the judges who sit in the nation's trial courts. 
this count is Heuer and Penrod's (no date) finding that judges are no more likely to disagree with 
jury verdicts when cases are complex than when they are not. This suggests that over the long 
run jury and judge verdicts are not likely to differ because of factors that. distinguish complex 
cases from simpler ones. 
Human Decision Making 
In short we have no reliable empirical basis for saying, that judge trials are preferable to 
jury trials in complex cases because litigants are more likely to receive decisions based on a 
rational evaluation of the evidence, nor can we reach the opposite conclusion. Perhaps we are on 
firmest ground when we simply note that modern psychology has demonstrated numbers of ways 
in which human decision makers, act irrationally, if consistency in dealing with formally identical 
problems or scientifically rational models such as  Bayesy Theorem are valid standards of rational 
decision making (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Moreover, people 
sometimes will be influenced by actions or conditions they are not aware of, and they may 
misattribute their decisions to factors that have not influenced them a t  all (Nisbett and Wilson, 
1977). Even knowing about these dangers does not necessarily protect one from them. All people 
have limited capacities which can lead to problems in understanding difficult, unfamiliar matter. 
No matter how rationally one thinks about a problem, limited capacities, such as an inability to 
remember everything in situations of information overload, can promote error. Both judges and 
jurors are human. The chances are that judges and juries are more like each other in the 
problems they confront as  fact finders in complex cases than that they are different. 
Judicial Bias and Overreaching 
But it appears that there is one advantage that juries maintain. This is that in some 
number of complex cases they are likely to be the fairer decision maker, both in appearance and 
reality. The Pennzoil trial provides a vivid example of why a jury may appear to be and perhaps 
is a fairer decision maker. In Pennzoil, two days after Judge Farris was chosen to supervise 
pretrial proceedings, Joe Jamail, plaintiffs lead counsel, donated $10,000 to the Farris reelection 
campaign. Up until that time Jamail had given Farris $100. Jarnail also gave $10,000 to the 
reelection campaign of the judge who was Farris' administrative superior. Farris in turn, though 
one can never know for certain what influenced him, made a number of questionable pretrial 
evidentiary rulings that severely hampered the case Texaco wanted to present (Petzinger, 
1 9 8 7 ) . ~ ~  
Consider also the work of Bermant and his coauthors (1981). They interviewed lawyers in 
11 protracted cases that could have been tried to either a judge or a jury. Their basic finding is 
not a t  all surprising: lawyers prefer to' try their cases before the fact finder that gives them a 
better chance of winning. All six attorneys who chose jury trials and said why they did so listed 
the identity of the judge as the main or only reason. Four of these attorneys specifically referred 
to the biases of the judges assigned to hear the case, and bias may have motivated the two who 
simply gave the judge's identity as  their reason for choosing a jury trial. In two of the four cases 
in which the parties could have forced a jury trial but agreed to a bench trial, the competence and 
fairness of the judge was mentioned as  the most important reason, with one attorney specifically 
noting that he looked on jury trials as, "buffers against incompetent judges" (Bermant et al., 
1981, 39). 
Several lawyers interviewed by Bermant and his coauthors noted reasons other than bias 
or judicial competence for wanting or avoiding a jury trial. Chief among these other reasons was a 
sense of how one's client or witnesses would appear to the jury. Two attorneys, both of whom had 
been forced by their opponents to try their cases to juries, said that they preferred bench trials 
when their cases were strong and jury trials when their cases were weak, implying that judges 
are more accurate fact finders than juries. 
Viewing the comments reported by the Bermant team together a mixed picture emerges. 
I t  seems that lawyers view jury trials in protracted cases (and perhaps in all cases) primarily as  a 
protection against judicial bias. But they also see juries as  responding to certain "human 
elements" which judges might ignore, and as less predictable than judges in the sense that a weak 
case does not necessarily mean defeat. At the same time where a case is protracted and both 
lawyers have confidence in the competence and integrity of the trial judge, agreement to waive a 
jury trial may not be difficult to achieve. Whether the views these lawyers have of the relative 
merits of juries and judges is an accurate one is difficult to determine. There is a considerable 
body of research, beginning with Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jurv (1966), indicating that 
even when aspects of a case might appeal to the prejudices of jurors, unless the case is otherwise 
close on the facts the evidence dominates (see, e.g., Visher, 1987). One might similarly expect 
judicial biases to be tempered by the weight of the evidence. If so the choice of a bench or jury 
trial is more likely to affect the outcome when a case is close on the facts than when the evidence. 
29 One should note that in the day-to-day evidentiary rulings a t  trial, Farris' rulings, particularly 
a t  the outset, favored the defense on such mundane matters as  objections to leading questions and 
hearsay. 
clearly favors one side. It is in these cases where i t  is most important to avoid a biased judge, or, 
for that  matter, a biased jury. 
The right to trial by jury also provides some degree of protection against the managerial 
judge, a figure that  has been both praised and damned in the scholarly literature (Elliot, 1986) 
The power of a judge bent on settling a case in accord with his or her sense of justice is 
considerable (Schuck, 1986a, b) even if the exercise of this kind of judicial authority may be 
questioned (Fksnik, 1982). In some cases managerial judges have used tactics that parties might 
perceive as coercive to achieve settlements they regarded as fair. I t  is simply a fact of modern 
litigation that  judges who desire to mold cases to their preferences have substantial power to do 
so. If a judge who favored a certain result were sure to t ry  the case if a suggested settlement was 
declined, the judge's power to coerce settlements would truly know no bounds. Thus a right to 
jury trial in complex cases may be necessary to ensure that  the more basic due process right of a 
fair trial remains. 
To sum up, even if juries cannot resolve complex cases rationally, one cannot be sure that  
bench trials would improve the situation. Judges too make mistakes in dealing with the kinds of 
scientific and specialized evidence that  make many complex cases difficult. One may easily find 
examples of judges who when confronted with difficult, unfamiliar evidence get things wrong. We 
currently have no empirical basis for saying that  judges will ordinarily do better than juries in 
deciding complex cases, nor do we have a n  adequate empirical basis for reaching the opposite 
conclusion. Thus there is no guarantee that  due process in the form of accurate fact finding will 
be enhanced, even on the average, by replacing juries with judges in cases that  promise to be 
complex. Moreover, in the situation where the judge is most likely to do better than the jury, that 
is where the judge is known to be both fair and competent, it appears on the basis of limited 
anecdotal evidence that  a jury trial is most likely to be waived, and if there is a jury trial other 
anecdotal evidence suggests that  the jury system will function a t  its best. 
If it is difficult to choose between bench and jury trials when rational fact finding is taken 
a s  a due process requisite, i t  seems easier when the right to an impartial decision maker or the 
right to meaningful trial are the values that  due process protects. Here i t  appears that  situations 
arise where the right to a jury trial in complex litigation is an important guarantor of due process 
rights30 
30  1 do not mean to suggest that  the jury will always be impartial and the judge not. An 
inadequate voir dire or prejudices too subtle to spot may lead to a biased jury in situations where 
PROCEDURAL REFORM 
The third point that  I made in my 1981 article was that  even if juries as  now constituted 
were incapable of rationally deciding complex cases, one should not read a complexity exception 
into the Seventh Amendment unless the jury's incapacities were inherent in the institution. 
Before giving up on the jury, I argued, we should be sure that  we can not increase jury 
competence through changes in the way we handle jury cases. Included among the possible 
changes I mentioned were rewriting jury instructions to make them more comprehensible, 
furnishing jurors with written copies of the court's instructions, giving jurors preinstructions, 
allowing jurors to deliberate on various issues as  the case progressed, routinely seating 12-person 
juries, furnishing jurors with daily transcripts (as an  alternative to another possible reform -juror 
note taking), dividing issues for decision, refusing party joinder, providing appointed experts to 
help the jury understand the testimony of the parties' expert witnesses, removing factual 
controversies by encouraging stipulations, using masters to clarify particularly difficult issues, 
sitting partial blue ribbon juries and allowing jurors to ask questions. Many commentators have 
suggested similar reforms a s  ways of helping juries cope with complexity (see, e.g. Cecil e t  al., 
1991; Durham, 1986; McLaughlin, 1983; Olander, 1985; Schwarzer, 1982; Willging, 1986; 
Withrow and Suggs, 1980), and the new Manual for Complex Litigation endorses some of these 
reforms as  well (Taylor e t  al., 1985). The potential for simplifying complex litigation through 
partial summary judgment (Durham, 1986; Schwarzer, 1982) and for using special masters to 
promote coherent case organization or to actively encourage factual stipulations has also been 
noted (Brazil, 1982, 1986; Brazil e t  al., 1983). 
The implications of such reforms for jury competence may all, in principle, be examined 
empirically, but there has been little rigorous social scientific investigation of any of them in the 
the judge is unbiased. However, the right to jury trial itself - a t  least in criminal cases - is an  
element of due process, which suggests that  the possibility of benefitting from certain kinds of jury 
biases is in some measure a n  element of due process. 
I also recognize that  due process is not considered to be violated in settings where it is . 
permissible to dispense with a jury such as  suits in equity. As a formal matter this is certainly 
true since due process is in large measure historically defined. Yet even in equity, if bias could be 
proved, due process would be violated by using a partial judge. However, bias can be hard to 
demonstrate. In Pennzoil, for example, Judge Farris was challenged on the basis of the $10,000 
campaign contribution from Jamail which was the largest single contribution he had received and 
amounted to about 10% of his reelection funds, but the judge who heard the challenge ruled there 
was no cause for disqualification. Totally apart  from the issue of bias, the point of the Seventh 
Amendment, is tha t  in civil actions a t  law brought in the federal courts the process due includes 
the right to a jury trial if one party requests it. 
years since I wrote.3 Among the few topics that have been the subject of carefully controlled 
research are preinstructions, the use of written jury instructions, jury note taking and jury 
question asking. 
Preinstructions 
Supporting the idea of preinstructing juries on the substantive issues in a case is research 
in cognitive psychology which suggests that informing juries of how to frame information they are 
about to receive can enhance recall and aid in the interpretation of ambiguous material (Smith, 
1990). Thus it has been suggested that preinstructions might help a jury understand the evidence 
in a complex case. Smith (1988, described in Smith, 1990) reports partial support for this view. 
She found that the timing of instructions did not affect the recall of mock jurors for either relevant 
or irrelevant facts in a homicide case nor did the timing of instructions affect how the evidence 
was interpreted. However, mock jurors instructed both before and after the trial were better able 
to apply the law to the facts of the case than jurors instructed only after the trial. 
Preinstruction on general matters such as  the presumption of innocence, burdens of proof 
or the limited admissibility of certain evidence could in theory affect how evidence is encoded and 
in this way could affect verdicts.32 Heuer and Penrod report a field study in which Wisconsin 
3 l  Convincing experimental research on rewriting jury instructions had been done by 1981 (see 
e.g. Charrow & Charrow, 1979) and indicated that legal instructions could be rewritten to enhance 
jury comprehension considerably. Most states have not acted to revise their jury instructions, and 
among the states that have only a few states have rewritten their jury instructions with this 
research in mind (Tanford, 1991). 
32 Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) found that mock jurors who were preinstructed on the 
presumption of innocence and the need to prove guilt in a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt 
gave lower estimates of guilt both during and after all the evidence was in than did mock jurors 
who were instructed only after the evidence was in or who received no instructions a t  all. The 
latter jurors were in their judgments very much like those jurors who were instructed only after 
all the evidence was in. Kassin and Wrightsman provide an information integration explanation 
for their findings, arguing that the preinstructed mock jurors began deliberations with a lower 
prior probability of guilt which affected their judgments of the defendant's likely guilt as they 
assimilated the evidence offered a t  trial. However, recent work by Pennington and Hastie on 
"story models" (1986, 1988, 1991) calls the adequacy of information integration models into 
question. An alternative explanation consistent with more general findings in cognitive psychology 
is that the early instructions affected the way in which the mock jurors encoded the information 
they received (as more consistent with innocence) so that a t  each point they remembered the 
evidence as  less probative of guilt than those who had not been preinstructed. From an encoding 
perspective, instruction after all the evidence was in would not be expected to have a substantial 
effect because the evidence received would have been already encoded and so would be 
remembered in a way more consistent with guilt. An encoding explanation also has the virtue of 
consistency with research which suggests that instructions to disregard or limit evidence will be 
relatively ineffective (Casper et  al., 1989; Hans and Doob, 1976) a s  well as  research on the timing 
trial judges agreed to randomly assign cases to a "preinstruction" or a "no preinstruction" 
condition.33 I t  appears that  preinstructions did not hur t  the trial process and may have helped. 
Jurors who received preinstructions reported that  the preinstructions generally helped them in 
accomplishing such tasks a s  evaluating the evidence during the trial, applying the law to the facts, 
remembering the judge's instructions, etc., but a comparison of their responses with the responses 
of jurors who had not been preinstructed does not support their belief that  they were better off in 
these ways than if they had not been preinstructed. They were, however, more satisfied with the 
way their trial had been conducted than jurors who had not been preinstructed, and judge's were 
both less surprised by the verdicts of preinstructed juries and more satisfied with them. As for 
costs, lawyers and judges saw preinstructions as  having virtually no disruptive or adverse affects 
on the jury and a s  tending to increase the fairness of trials. Thus preinstructions seemed to have 
had only positive effects34, if they had any effects a t  all. Since Heuer and Penrod do not report 
what preinstructions were given, further work must be done to see whether their findings apply to 
both case-focused substantive pre-instructions and to instructions on matters like relevant burdens 
of proof that  are common across trials. 
Written Instructions 
Heuer and Penrod's study of pretrial instructions also randomized the presentation of 
written instructions to juries for use during their deliberations. Jurors who received written 
instructions reported that  these instructions helped them in a variety of ways but, their ratings of 
the helpfulness and understandability of the judge's instructions was no higher than the ratings of 
those who did not receive written instructions, and jurors who had received written instructions 
performed no better on a multiple choice test designed to measure comprehension of the judge's 
instructions than did jurors who only had been instructed orally.35 Neither jury deliberations nor 
of opening statements (Wells e t  al., 1985). Hastie (1983) and Sales e t  al. (1977) also examined 
the effects of preinstructions finding relatively few effects and none that  seem to justify strong 
reliance. 
33 I t  was apparently left to the judge to decide what to preinstruct on and they did not report on 
this. Thus, we do not know for a given judge or for the mix of cases whether the preinstructions 
given contained general instructions, case-specific substantive instructions or a mixture of the two. 
34 There was no difference between the effects of preinstruction in more or less complex cases, 
where complexity is operationalized by the length of the trial. My hunch, however, is that  the 
Wisconsin trials that  Heuer and Penrod studied probably included few if any that  would qualify as 
complex in the sense that we have been using that  term in this paper. 
the trial seemed to be affected in other significant ways by written instructions, nor did written 
instructions seem to function differently in longer cases than in shorter ones. However, judge's 
and lawyers generally approved of written  instruction^^^ and did not see the need to furnish them 
as  causing significant problems. Because all parties seemed to like written instructions and they 
seemed to cause no harm, Heuer and Penrod recommend written instructions as- a jury reform. 
Note Taking. and Juror Questions 
Heuer and Penrod also provide us' with the best research to date on the effects of allowing 
jurors to take notes or ask questions. They didtwo field studies of these procedures, one in 
Wisconsin (Heuer and Penrod, 1988) and one with cooperating federal judges across the nation 
(Heuer and Penrod, no date). The Wisconsin study, like the study of preinstructions and written 
instructions, showed no great benefits but little harm to come from these procedures. The national 
study, however, is more relevant to our concerns since the authors looked specifically at how note 
taking and question asking function in complex a s  well as simpler cases. It is this study I shall 
focus on. 
The national study involved 103 federal judges who agreed to assign one or two cases on 
an  experimental basis.37 The authors randomly assigned cases to the experimental conditions 
and the judges implemented these assignments either in their next case or, if they were willing to 
accept two assignments, in both their next case and their next complex case. All told, the authors 
collected data on 75 civil and 85 criminal trials. 
35 As Diamond (1993) points out Heuer and Penrod only tested comprehension of general 
instructions so they could use their instrument across trials. This performance measure may not 
have been sensitive to the advantages of trial-specific written instructions. 
36 The major reason why a true random sample was not achieved in the Wisconsin field study 
was that  attorneys refused to go along with the experimental assignment in some cases. This 
happened most frequently with respect to written instructions which a t  the time of the study were 
required in Wisconsin. Defense attorneys, in particular, were reluctant to waive their right to 
have the jury furnished with written instructions. This is the best testimony to their popularity. 
37 2000 judges were originally contacted. While two-thirds of the 314 judges who returned a 
questionnaire saying why they declined to participate indicated they were no longer hearing jury 
trials, the participation rate is still so low that  one cannot be certain from a sampling standpoint 
that  the results of this study would generalize to the federal courts a s  a group. But while 
generalization cannot be guaranteed by the nature of the sample, there are  few reasons to expect 
that  the results will not generalize. The most important reason to have reservations is that  
participating judges probably had more interest in the experimental procedures than non- 
participating judges. It may be that  without an interested judge the effects the authors observe 
would be different. Also participating judges may be more capable than non-participants and the 
capacity of a jury in a complex case seems in part  to be a function of the capacity of the judge 
presiding a t  the trial. 
Based on judicial responses three dimensions of complexity were defined, one relating most 
closely to the complexity of the evidence, a second to the quantity of the evidence and a third to 
the.complexity of the law.38 On average, the judges seemed satisfied with the jury's 
performance, rating the jury verdicts in both criminal and civil cases above 7 on a nine point scale 
with respect to both legal correctness (9=strong agreement that  the verdict is legally correct) and 
their own satisfaction with the verdict (9 = very satisfied). A composite of these and two other 
items reveals that  judicial satisfaction with the jury's performance did not vary with the 
complexity of the case. 
~ u r o r s  who were allowed to ask questions had significantly higher scores than those not 
allowed to ask questions with respect to feeling well-informed, the perceived ease of reaching 
verdicts and understanding the law, the perceived helpfulness of the prosecutor and ,defense 
counsel, and the certainty that  they felt that  t.he verdict was correct.3g Surprisingly, jurors 
allowed to take notes felt they were less well informed than jurors who were not allowed to take 
notes, and they reported it was more difficult to reach a verdict. Judicial approval of jury verdicts 
was, however, not affected by either of the two experimental proceduresand this finding does not 
change with case complexity. Excluding hung juries in criminal cases judges agreed with the 
juries' verdicts in about three-quarters of the criminal trials and in about 63% of the civil cases. 
Interestingly, in civil cases judges were considerably more likely to disagree when juries returned 
defendants' verdicts (52% disagreement) thanwhen juries returned plaintiffs' verdicts (29% 
disagreement). Disagreement did not seem to be related to case complexity or trial procedures or 
to their interaction. 
A test of interaction effects revealed that  jurors found the ability to ask questions 
increasingly helpful (in the sense they felt well informed and found it easy to understand the law) 
as the law became more complex. Permission to ask questions also added more to jurors' 
. . confidence in their verdicts a s  the evidence became more complex. However, a s  the amount of 
information offered a t  trial increased, the chance to ask questions seemed to backfire. With heavy 
3 8  The length of the trial in hours was related to both the complexity of the evidence and, 
somewhat less strongly, -to the quantity of the evidence as measured by the number of pages of 
documents in evidence, the number of items of evidence submitted and the number of parties. 
Thus the study indicates that.long trials tend to involve masses of evidence, at least some of which 
is more complex than the evidence found in most trials. 
39 There were 71 trials in which question asking was allowed but in only 51 of these was one or 
more.questions asked according to a preliminary report of the data. (American Judicature 
Society, 1988). (Heuer & Penrod report 74 cases in which question asking was allowed.) While 
Heuer and Penrod don't address the issue specifically, i t  appears that  they compared trials based 
on whether question asking was allowed and riot based on whether i t  occurred. This analytical 
decision is in keeping with the design of the experiment. 
information loads those jurors allowed to ask questions were less likely to feel well informed than 
jurors not allowed to ask questions and more likely to report difficultly in understanding the law 
and reaching a verdict. For note taking the two-way interactions with the legal dimension of 
complexity are significant but directionally inconsistent so that in some situations increasing legal 
complexity is associated with positive juror evaluations and in other cases it is associated with 
negative reports. The most important findings seem to be that as  legal complexity increases, note 
taking jurors are less likely to feel satisfied with their verdicts and are less certain they have 
reached the right result than jurors not allowed to take notes. 
Heuer and Penrod also examined certain procedures which varied because responding 
judges handled cases in different ways. They found that an initial juror orientation contributed to 
juror satisfaction, and that the use of special verdict forms increased not only juror satisfaction but 
also verdict confidence and feelings of understanding the judge's instructions and being well 
informed. Judges who commented on the evidence or summarized, on the other hand, left jurors 
feeling that it was harder to reach a verdict and harder to understand the law, and the closer that 
judges hewed to pattern verdict instructions the less confidence jurors had in the verdicts they 
reached.40 Judicial satisfaction with jury performance is not, however, affected by the use of any 
of these four procedures. 
One way of interpreting these data is that jurors feel that they perform better when they 
can ask questions, when they are given verdict forms, and when they receive an initial 
orientation. But if juries do perform better with these aids, judges seem not to notice.41 One 
might argue that so long as jurors feel they are being helped by certain measures, such measures 
should be used, and this is what Heuer and Penrod conclude. However, it is not clear that the 
juror responses that Heuer and Penrod treat as  positive indicators of competence are always that. 
For example, confidence in a verdict rendered in a close, complex case may be illusory since there 
40 With respect to both comments and special verdict forms I have ignored a significant 
association with the perceived helpfulness of the plaintifflprosecutor because I don't think it is as 
important as  the dimensions I cite, and I don't know precisely what to make of it. I am also 
ignoring significant interactions involving those variables that were not experimentally varied. 
There are a number of interactions, but they are a t  times directionally inconsistent, and given the 
lack of experimental control, their interpretation is problematic. 
41 Since there are fewer responses from judges than from jurors, one possible reason why juror 
responses are significantly associated with procedural variations while judicial responses are not is 
the relative lack of power in the analyses that deal with judges' reactions. I t  is difficult to 
evaluate this possibility since comparable statistics are not presented for judges and jurors. 
However, given the small amount of variance that the procedural measures uniquely explain when 
judicial satisfaction is dependent, it is probably a mistake to attribute the lack of significance of 
these measures to a problem of power. Relative differences in power are more plausible as  an 
explanation of why certain interactions are significant when the jurors' views are dependent but 
not when the judges' attitudes are. 
may be no verdict in which a fact finder should feel truly confident. A juror who felt less confident 
in such a case might have done a more honest job of grappling with the evidence and returned a 
verdict more likely to be correct. The same could be said about the sense that a verdict is easy. 
Indeed, it may be that certain juror attitudes toward their experiences have a different normative 
status depending on whether cases are close on the evidence or easy, and simple to comprehend or 
complex. Thus while the Heuer and Penrod study is the best effort to date to shed an empirical 
light on the utility of reforms designed to increase jury competence, their results are inescapably 
ambiguous, for the normative status of their dependent variables is not completely clear. It may 
be for this reason that judicial evaluations do not confirm juror reports. 
Informal Experiments 
If there have been few rigorous scientific experiments evaluating proposed jury reforms, 
there has been no lack of experimentation in a more colloquial sense. We saw, for example, in our 
case studies that most of the trial judges involved "experimented" with one or more of the 
procedural reforms that have been commonly suggested. Indeed, some reforms such as note 
taking may be more the rule in complex cases than the exception.42 It appears that when judges 
try innovative procedures they seldom find the harms they feared and often perceive apparent 
benefits. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the work of Sand and h i s s  (1985). Sand and h i s s .  
persuaded one or more of the 28 judges serving on the Second Circuit in June of 1983 to try one or 
more of seven "novel" procedures. These procedures included: ten minutes of attorney 
participation in voir dire, individual, private voir dire, preinstructing the jury, allowing jurors to 
ask questions, informing jurors they could take notes, providing jurors with a written copy of the 
charge and providing jurors with a tape recording of the charge. Sand and Reiss found in almost 
every instance that if lawyers and judges could be induced to go along with a procedure, a 
majority, sometime an overwhelming majority, reacted favorably to it. These findings are 
consistent with later work by Heuer and Penrod (1988, 1990) who report that those Wisconsin 
judges, lawyers and jurors who participated in their field experiments invariably liked the 
innovative procedures they experienced, and they liked them more and saw fewer problems with 
them than judges, lawyers and jurors who had not experienced the procedures but were asked how 
they thought they would have reacted to them. 
42 Heuer and Penrod (1991) in a survey that elicited 553 responses find that judges report 
allowing note taking in about 113 of their trials and only 37% of judges say they have never 
allowed juror note taking. One would expect that judges who sometimes allow note taking are 
more prone to allow it as  case complexity increases. 
Let the Reforms B e e n  
Having reviewed the evidence I cannot say that  there is an adequate empirical basis for 
concluding that  reforms like those that  have been proposed will make the jury a better fact finder 
in complex cases. Yet given a wealth of unsystematic experience and some few experiments, it 
appears likely that  certain proposed reforms will not be harmful and there is reason, in common 
sense, scientific theory, and occasional experience to believe that  certain of the suggested reforms 
will do some good. Where the likelihood of harm is low, and the possibility of benefits exists there 
is a case for action, a s  there is when some harm is possible but the likelihood of net benefits is, 
given what we know, substantial. I believe that  a number of the proposed procedural reforms fit 
one or the other of these two circumstances. Thus rather than wait for definitive research, some 
of the proposed procedural reforms should be instituted now. 
But since we are acting without full knowledge, we should in-innovating act to gain 
knowledge. Ideally courts would institute any reforms experimentally, but this is unlikely to 
happen. In default of experimental implementation, there should be a systematic attempt, 
perhaps under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State 
Courts, to monitor reforms and systematically canvass reactions to them. Also these agencies and 
other funding sources should make the continued experimental evaluation of such reforms a 
priority. Many reforms are plausible; I will discuss ten I would like to see. 
First there is note taking. Opposing note taking seems futile, for i t  is already often 
allowed in complex cases. Note taking was permitted in a number of our case studies, and in no 
case in which it was allowed, was there a suggestion of any problems. Moreover, there is some 
theoretical reason to believe that  note taking might increase juror involvement with in the trial 
and juror performance (Friedland, 1991). However, the Heuer and Penrod (no date) experiment 
provides some cause for concern. In their experiment note taking was associated with feeling less 
well informed and finding i t  harder to decide on a verdict. These feelings are  too consistent with 
a n  hypothesized danger of note taking: the possibility that  jurors who take notes will miss 
information as  they try to copy other information down;43 to be summarily dismissed. Thus, in 
trials where daily transcripts are being prepared jurors might be barred from taking notes and 
instead be furnished with transcripts to use as  they see fit. The reactions and performance of 
jurors furnished with transcripts should be compared with those of jurors in similar trials who 
instead may take notes. 
43 Heuer and Penrod (1988) in their Wisconsin field experiment did not find any evidence that  
this occurred. 
The second reform I would implement today is to allow jurors to pose questions. This is 
the reform most strongly supported by the Heuer and Penrod field experiment, and it seems to be 
the one most desired by jurors as  well (Strier, 1988). The experimental and anecdotal evidence 
both suggest that jurors do not abuse the privilege, and questions may give lawyers an idea of 
how well jurors are following the evidence. I t  should be noted, however, that questioning was 
allowed in the ~ennzoi l  trial and the judge ceased to allow it part way through the trial (Shannon, 
1988) Problems with questioning may have arisen in that trial because the judge permitted jurors 
to interject questions orally a t  any point in the testimony simply by raising their hands. When 
jurors submit written questions after a witness has finished the direct or cross-examination, 
problems are not reported. 
Third, and somewhat less confidently, I suggest that a t  the outset of complex cases jurors 
receive a composite of preinstructions and an orientation lecture. The case for this change is 
better grounded in theory than in experimental evidence, although some apparently positive 
effects appeared in the Heuer and Penrod (no date) experiment. Theory suggests that if the jurors 
are aware of the issues they have to resolve, they may be better able to understand the evidence 
they receive and to put otherwise confusing evidence in an understandable perspective. Theory 
coupled with some evidence tells us that instructions concerning how evidence should be coded are 
better given before evidence is encountered than after the fact. In accordance with these views 
jurors should be informed before the trial begins of the legal issues they are expected to resolve 
and of the major factual disputes between parties. While this is also the stuff of opening 
statements, an introduction unskewed by partisanship might be a helpful prelude to the parties' 
versions. There is, however, a danger of reversible error here and a judge should develop such 
comments carefully in consultation with the parties. 
I t  also makes sense for the judge to preinstruct the jury, as  judges now often do, on what 
is and is not evidence, on how they should respond to objections, on why discussions occur out of 
the jurors' hearing or with the jury escorted out of the courtroom, and on similar matters. A 
potentially important preinstruction is that commonly given which emphasizes that there are two 
sides to a case and that the jurors should not discuss the case or make up their minds until they 
have heard all the evidence. While some people regard such instructions as  futile, there is 
anecdotal evidence from jurors serving in lengthy trials that the temptation to discuss a case as  it 
progresses can be and often is resisted. The effectiveness of the instruction to maintain an open 
mind is more problematic since jurors admit to leaning toward one side or the other as  a case 
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progresses. Perhaps the goal of the instruction would be enhanced if jurors were told a t  the outset 
that when they began deliberations, they should not vote immediately but should together review 
the evidence in the case. Both some of the case studies and mock jury research (Hawkins, 1960; 
Hastie e t  a]., 1983) indicates that early voting can make for less productive deliberations. 
I t  is probably also wise to explain the burden of proof to jurors a t  the outset and, if it is a 
criminal case, to acquaint jurors with the presumption of innocence. The theoretical reason for 
this is that jurors may engage in "on line" decision making, and if they do it should a t  least be 
with knowledge of the correct standard. However, despite the Kassin and Wrightsman (1979) 
study that purports to have shown the virtues of this instruction experimentally, this 
recommendation as  based more on common sense and theory than on experimental evidence. 
Fourth, each juror should be given copies of the instructions in writing to refer to during 
deliberations. 
Fifth, complex cases should be simplified through pre-trial stipulations, severance of joined 
claims or counts, partial summary judgment if facts are truly not in dispute, and other ways of 
limiting the issues in dispute. A particularly effective technique, is to allot only a limited time to 
the parties to present their cases. Where one party's case is inherently more time consuming 
than the other's difficult problems of fairness may arise. Two of the courts in our case studies 
used this technique to apparently good effect. Also, to promote simplification a court should not 
allow parties to present technical documents largely to impress jurors with their bulk, 
as  may have occurred in the ABA trade secrets case. If documents are redundant or unnecessary 
they should be.ruthlessly pared down according to the provisions of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence to what is new and essential. If it is unlikely that jurors will understand certain 
documents those documents should not be admitted unless the party offering them offers evidence 
to aid in their understanding. 
Sixth, steps should be taken, as they often are today, to ensure that jurors can easily 
follow documentary evidence. One aid in this respect is the loose-leaf trial notebook that can be 
added to as exhibits are offered. Such notebooks can include a t  the outset information about 
important facts the parties have agreed on. Documentary evidence should be distributed to the 
jurors so that they can follow it as  it is discussed or visual aids should be used to the same effect. 
Those documents and exhibits admitted into evidence should be organized and indexed for easy 
retrieval once the jury has retired to the jury room. The jury should not be given boxes of 
unorganized exhibits as  has occasionally happened. 
Seventh, legal instructions should long since have been rewritten so as  to be more 
comprehensible. In jurisdictions where this has not happened (most places) rewriting should occur. 
. Eighth, jury questions during the deliberations should be answered in plain language. 
Juries should not simply be referred back to the instructions. We saw in several of the case 
studies that such references seldom helped and that in the absence of judicial guidance a 
reasonable interpretation of an instruction could be wrong. Indeed, in several of the cases where 
the jury verdict seemed to reflect a legal misinterpretation, the jury had realized it was having 
trouble understanding what the law required and had sought the court's aid in understanding but 
had not received any. As a corollary to this recommendation, so long a s  a court's answers to juror 
questions appear fair and helpful, appellate courts should not reverse trial courts simply because 
precise legal language was not tracked and an  unlikely legal misinterpretation is possible. 
Ninth, larger juries should be used. We saw in a number of cases that  jurors tend to 
follow the lead of their most competent members when cases are complex. Increasing the number 
of jurors increases the likelihood that  there will be one or more jurors who have a good 
understanding of the law and evidence. In addition, the larger the jury the better the jury's 
collective memory is likely to be. The recent amendment to Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which eliminates alternate jurors, should help achieve larger juries since no court will 
seat  only six jurors in a complex case and risk a mistrial should one juror be unable to continue. 
Courts should routinely seat  twelve jurors when cases a re  likely to be complex. Indeed, in lengthy 
complex cases where substantial juror attrition is a danger, the court should seek the parties' 
consent to ignore the limitations of the new rule and seat  more than twelve jurors, with the 
understanding that if more than twelve jurors remain at the end of the trial excess jurors will be 
treated a s  alternates. Otherwise there is a small danger that  juror attrition over the course of a 
long trial will reduce the jury to fewer than six members, allowing one party to force a mistrial 
and the more likely possibility that  by the time the case reaches the jury the strengths that larger 
juries afford will be dissipated. If there is a return to larger juries it will make increasing sense to 
allow verdicts to be returned in civil cases over the dissent of one or two jurors in order to prevent 
hung juries or, more likely, the excessive influence, a s  in the ABA trade secrets case, of a lone and 
probably incorrect dissenter. Accepting non-unanimous verdicts in federal civil cases requires the 
consent of the parties which a judge should try to secure in advance; allowing non-unanimous 
verdicts in civil cases without party consent is a matter for Congress's agenda. 
Tenth, courts should encourage the selection of competent jurors. The tactical desire to 
gain a jury that  can be fooled deserves no legal respect. The issue is, however, a delicate one, for 
judicial intervention to ensure juror competence can interfere with a party's right to exercise 
peremptory challenges. But some interference is tolerable if, a s  I have argued elsewhere 
(Lempert, 1978) the peremptory challenge is justified largely as  a device to eliminate prejudice 
which escapes the sieve of the challenge for cause. Encroachments, however, have already been 
made on the peremptory challenge to forestall racial prejudice and with further encroachments for 
other good reasons the peremptory challenge will be reduced to a challenge for cause. Thus, I do 
not support legal change in this area. Rather I recommend judicial jawboning. The trial judge 
should make the desirability of securing a capable jury clear and should urge the attorneys not to 
challenge those jurors who seem most likely to understand the issues in the case. Where such a 
juror is challenged it would not be untoward for the judge to ask an attorney why the challenged 
juror was  thought undesirable. While an  attorney would be free to tell the court there was no 
reason, few attorneys would want to admit, even implicitly, that  they wished to avoid jurors who 
seemed likely to understand the case. Provisions should also be made to compensate jurors 
generously in trials that  exceed a certain length so that  fewer people would seek to be excused 
where cases are likely to last more than a few weeks.44 
I could go on and suggest more changes that  might now be made, but I suspect these ten 
are more than are likely to happen in the near future. The important point that  bears reemphasis 
is that  the institution of any such changes should be the occasion for more study and not a signal 
that  research on these matters is no longer needed because reform has occurred. None of these 
suggestions is a s  firmly rooted in reliable research as  I would like it to be, but I believe that  each 
can be plausibly justified based upon what we now know. 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
I have now canvassed the research done since my first article that  bears on the three 
issues that  in my view had to be resolved to support a due-process-based complexity exception to 
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. There has, however, been another development since 
1981 in the psychological understanding of jury trials that  relates to the likely capacity of juries in 
complex cases. This is the development of a new model of jury decisionmaking, which Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie, its principal proponents, call the "story model." (1986, 1988, 1991) 
The story model suggests that  jurors try to make sense out of the evidence they are offered by 
constructing the story that  best explains it. It is an  exciting and plausible development in the 
effort to understand jury decision making both in its own right and because it fits in nicely with 
recent developments in cognitive psychology, where stories are a kind of schema that links people, 
motives and actions (Bennett and Feldman, 1981; Black e t  al., 1984; Holstein, 1985; Schank, 
1990). . 
44 Without going into detail, I support the creation of a fund that would .drastically increase the 
payment jurors receive in any trial that  extends past 14 trial days. To pay for such a fund I 
would "tax" the payments made to lawyers in lengthy cases where money damages are sought or 
where litigation is over a commercial matter. For example, in lengthy cases the parties might be 
charged 1% of all lawyer's fees paid for pretrial work and 3% of the fees paid for work during the 
trial. This proposal should not unduly discourage contingent fee representation since if the 
plaintiff lost there would be no fees to be taxed. It would also not discourage litigation over non- 
commercial matters disputed as  issues of principal since no fees would be taxed in such cases. 
The exact trigger for payment could be adjusted to take account of party responsibility for 
lengthening the trial. In some small measure the tax should encourage pretrial settlements and 
the shortening of cases that  go to trial. 
At present the story model has been largely used to explain jury decisions in cases like 
homicide cases where such alternative stories as the premeditated assault and the self defense 
story can be plausible explanations for the same array of evidence. The model seems to work well 
in these settings, and it illustrates how jurors can take evidence and, using various consistency 
criteria, try to fit it to one among a stock- of stories with which they are already familiar. We also 
see in the experimental evidence that preexisting story structures can lead to the misperception of 
certain evidence or the recall of evidence that was never presented. This is to be expected if 
stories are a type of schema. 
Now consider the complex case. From a story perspective there are two types. First, there 
are cases in which the evidence that makes a case complex can fit a slot, by which I mean a place 
that holds a story element, in a story. For example, consider a case like the W.R. Grace case. 
The plaintiffs main story line is not complex, and is one readily available to most jurors: a 
company carelessly dumps a poisonous effluent which reaches the water table and percolates to 
the plaintiffs well. The plaintiff drinks the water and becomes seriously ill. The easy conclusion is 
that the defendant is a wrongdoer who should pay for the harm its effluent caused. 
What makes the case difficult is not the unfamiliarity of the basic story line. Rather it is 
that a t  several points, the defendant argues that connections that the story assumes do not exist 
and suggests that science supports this argument. Thus, in W.R. Grace the defendant argued that 
the effluents could not reach the plaintiffs wells and that there was no proof that the effluent was 
the source of the increased incidence of leukemia in the plaintiff population. Thus, what is 
complex in the trial involves two story slots that must be filled in for the plaintiff to recover. 
There must be a way for the defendant's effluent to reach the plaintiffs's well and there must be a 
reason to conclude that the effluent caused the plaintiffs leukemia. The trial is not limited to 
these issues - the plaintiff for example must prove the defendant discharged the effluent, but the 
trial, particularly what is complex about the trial, turns-on them. 
We can think of the jury's decision regarding how to fill each slot as itself involving a 
competition among stories. But these competing stories are specialized stories which only 
scientific experts know well, and invariably in a case like JV.R.Grace the scientists whom the jury 
hears disagrees. How is a jury to decide between the scientists' stories if the jurors find the 
scientists' stories unfamiliar and have themselves no set of plausible stories to compare the 
scientific evidence with? To what extent will juror decisions reflect the ways in which the parts of 
the story that they can follow pull them along? Is, for example, the very fact that the plaintiffs 
are suffering from a feared and esoteric disease likely to lead jurors to the believe that the 
defendant's effluent must have seeped into the plaintiffs' wells and must have been capable of 
causing the disease because otherwise there is no explanation for the evidence before them. 
Would a jury that accepted the plaintiffs expert's scientific story for this reason be acting 
irrationally? Suppose instead of relying on an unfamiliar scientific story about how effluent 
travels, a juror instead relies on schemas with which he or she is familiar - like the stereotype 
that nervousness is associated with lying - to decide which expert's story to accept. Is this an 
irrational basis for decision? As for the judge, is there any reason to believe that he or she would 
do a better job than the jury? The judge is likely to have a stock of pollution stories in the same 
way the jury does, but like the jury, he or she is probably unfamiliar with the stories the scientists 
tell. Moreover, the trial judge's stories may be different than the stories the jury has or a t  least 
may be differentially accessible. The unscrupulous plaintiff's attorney story (plaintiff's attorney is 
known for drumming up litigation) may figure in the judge's evaluation of the evidence when it 
hardly enters into the jury's. Or the judge may have easy mental access to a story in which 
potential polluters are more responsible or pollution is less likely to be harmful - access not shared 
by the jurors. In this situation whose stock of stories should be brought to bear to help make 
sense of those aspects of the story - scientific stories within the story - that neither the judge nor 
the jury understands well? I don't intend to answer questions like these here, but they are worth 
raising and suggest a new approach to thinking about how judges and jurors respond to one kind 
of evidentiary complexity. 
The situation which characterizes other complex cases from a story perspective is one in 
which evidence is not necessarily hard to understand, but jurors are unlikely to be acquainted with 
the set of stories that most plausibly fit the evidence. The Pennzoil and MicroNest trials furnish 
examples. The jurors in these cases did not know various story lines that plausibly made sense of 
facts relating to competing tender offers or business understandings about the terms of loans. In 
cases like these it is not surprising if jurors are tempted to make sense of evidence given them by 
fitting it to stories they are more familiar with, such a s  a story of people making ordinary 
agreements. This tendency can be exacerbated when one side encourages the jury to use its 
ordinary stock of stories to make sense of the facts in the case. This occurred in -L It 
was perhaps best revealed in an interchange between the plaintiff's attorney Joe Jamail, a 
personal injury lawyer who ordinarily did no business litigation, and Marty Lipton, a well-known 
New York takeover lawyer. Jamail asked Lipton whether he was "saying that you have some 
distinction between just us ordinary people making contracts with each other, and whether or not 
it's a ten-billion -dollar deal? Is there a different standard in your mind?" Lipton replied, "Yes, 
indeed." Jim Shannon, who may have been the jury's most influential member, recalls, "At that 
point my jaw just dropped" (Petzinger, 1987, 37 1). For a Wall Street lawyer or for most judges 
(not necessarily the judge in the Pennzoil trial) an answer that the standard was the same might 
have caused jaws to drop. 
In these circumstances are we better off with trial to a jury or to a judge? Despite the 
Pennzoil case, people can learn that stories they have not heard of before are plausible (The 
entrapment story in DeLorean is a n  example). And in Pennzoil, there is no reason to believe that 
the judge would have decided differently; indeed, a number of his pretrial evidentiary rulings 
prevented Texaco from presenting a convincing, gapless version of the story it wanted to tell. 
Moreover, having access to a story that  appears to fit a body of evidence is not always a virtue, 
for when a story is familiar, evidence may be distorted, overlooked or even invented where the 
evidence recalls the story but does not fit i t  perfectly. The jury's virtue is that  different jurors 
have different preferred stories so the jury collectively is less likely than individual decision 
makers to be misled by the kinds of natural distortions and gap filling that  an  available story may 
stimulate. 
I do not pretend to have answers to the questions I pose, nor do I now suggest that  the 
story model provides a new or more adequate answer to the question of whether judges or juries 
are better situated to decide complex cases. But story model research does provide a new 
perspective on the issue; one that  I think is worth further thought and exploration. 
CONCLUSION 
I began this paper by recalling my earlier article which suggested that  three kinds of 
showings had to be made to justify a Supreme Court holding that  due process required a 
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. First, was a showing that  
juries did not decide such cases rationally; second was a showing that  changes in the management 
of juries and cases could not cure identifiable jury deficiencies and third was a showing that  judges 
would find facts in such cases more rationally. 
.I then proceeded to examine the empirical evidence relating to these three issues. It turns 
out that  much of the available evidence is anecdotal. It is the kind of evidence on which one does 
not want important policy decisions to turn. To the extent that there is systematic social science 
knowledge that  elucidates these three issues, none of i t  resolves an issue, and much of i t  is unclear 
in its import even if external validity concerns are discounted. In short, not enough social science 
research has been done to date to allow us to reach firm conclusions about the capacities of juries 
and judges to handle complex cases or about the potential improvement in jury capacity afforded 
by possible reforms. 
Thus, I could simply end this paper as  I ended my first one, with a call for additional 
empirical research, an argument that  the burden of proving the incapacity of juries in complex 
cases is on those who would limit the Seventh Amendment right, and a judgment that  that  burden 
has  not been met. 
But there is more to be said. Throughout this review, strengths of the jury emerge. A 
close look a t  a number of cases, including several in which jury verdicts appear mistaken, do not 
show juries that are befuddled by complexity. Even when juries do not fully understand technical 
issues, they can usually make enough sense of what is going on to deliberate rationally and they 
often reach quite defensible decisions. To the extent that  juries make identifiable mistakes, their 
mistakes usually seem attributable not to conditions uniquely associated with complexity but to 
the mistakes of judges and lawyers, to such systematic deficiencies of the trial process as  battles 
of experts and the prevalence of hard to understand jury instructions, and to the kinds of human 
error that  affect simple trials as well. The anecdotal evidence should also remind us that  it is 
difficult to predict which complex cases will trouble juries and which they will handle well. 
The import of the experimental literature is similar. Experiments show that  some factors 
that  make for complexity, like the joinder of charges or statistical evidence, can lead to jury 
mistakes. Yet in the most realistic studies, juries perform surprisingly well. In the study by 
Diamond and Casper, for example, contrary to what one might predict, regression models were as  
influential a s  the more concrete and intuitively understandable yardstick models. In the study by 
Horowitz and Bordens joined plaintiffs and scientific evidence caused few problems. Moreover, 
juries in the Diamond and Casper study, like some of the case study juries, showed an  
extraordinary capacity for identifying their most capable members and then letting them lead. 
This suggests that the challenges that  complex cases pose might be best met by the simple 
expedient of getting more capable people to serve on juries. 
The empirical evidence also provides no reason to believe that  judges will fare better in the 
face of complexity than juries, for we have little basis for deciding how judges will do at all. What 
we have instead are anecdotes which make the point tha t  judges dealing with.unfamiliar, technical 
information can be a s  confused as  we fear similarly situated juries are. Ultimately the most 
reasonable conclusion about the relative capacity of juries and judges is probably one that  I 
reached in my earlier article without substantial empirical support and a m  willing, still without 
substantial empirical support, to reiterate here: in complex cases we can expect that  some judges 
will be more capable than the average jury and we can expect that  the average jury will be more 
capable than some judges. But there will be many cases in which we will not know in advance 
whether judge or jury is likely to be the more rational decision maker. 
When it comes to reforming the way that  complex cases are managed and jury trials are 
conducted, we live in a world of constantly experimenting judges. The problem is that  the 
experimentation most judges do is uncontrolled, hardly visible and unsystematic, so that  we learn 
almost nothing from it  except what we can learn from the fact that  great outcries over various 
novel procedures seem not to have arisen. Given this, I have suggested that  we should apply the 
little we have learned from systematic experimentation, consider what social science theory 
suggests, add in a good dose of common sense and make those limited changes we think will 
improve the jury system. We should, however, resolve to study the changes we make so that we 
will learn if our hunches are right. 
.For more than a decade now the fitness of juries to hear complex cases has been on trial. 
Twelve years ago it was possible to say no more than tha t  the case against the civil jury had not 
been proven. We still do not have nearly the amount of evidence one would like, but there is 
enough to support a more positive verdict. Based on what  we now know today one cannot make 
out an empirical case for a "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amendment. Instead the 
weight of the evidence indicates that  iuries can reach rationallv defensible verdicts in complex 
casps. that  we cannot assume that  i u d ~ e s  in complex cases will perform better than iuries. and 
that  there are changes that  can be made to further enhance iurv performance, These conclusions 
will not necessarily be sustained as  research proceeds. But they are the best that  our knowledge 
base today can offer. 
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to Commit Arson 
2 weeks 
Conspiracy law, complex 
fact question. 5-day 
recess in mid-trial. 






Jurors requested but 
could not get a transcript 
of crucial testimony - 
complained of having to 


















Judge or Lawyer 
Responsibility 
Comments 





3 years of behavior to 
sort out, 175 exhibits. 
Notetaking - each side 











Antitrust - Price 
Maintenance Conspiracy 
9 days 
Unraveling meaning of an 
intricate chain of business 
transactions. Difficult 
instructions on conspiracy, 
use of business jargon. 
Special Verdict Form; 







Jurors with good 
understanding guided the 





















Judge or Lawyer 
Responsibility 
ABA Trade Secrets 
Federal 
ABA (1989) 
Trade secrets and 
restraint of trade 
6 weeks 
Highly technical testimony, 
subtle patent issues. Events 
involved many companies in 
4 countries over a 4 year 
period; 281 exhibits - law of 
tortious interference difficult 
to understand. 
Preliminary instructions; 
each side limited to 50 hours 




Pennzoil v. Texaco 
State 
Adler (1985) (1986) 
Tortious interference 
with contract 
4 112 months 
Need to understand 
Financial Analyses of costs 
of discovering oil, business 
concepts like "agreement 
in principlen, "leveraged 
buyout," and 
"indemnification." 
8 special questions posed, 
juror questions allowed 




Liability: judge, lawyer 
Damages: lawyer 
Cleveland v. C.E.I.#l 
Federal 
Austin (1984) 
Antitrust, Attempt to 
monopolize 
8 weeks 
Had to understand 
dacult concepts like 
"natural monopoly". 
5 special interrogatories. 
Moderate 
Low (?) (hung 5-1 against 
judge's apparent preferred 
verdict) 
Table One (continued) 
Comments 
ABA Trade Secrets 
Most able juror assumed 
leadership role; compromise 
verdict because of one 
holdout- lack of indexing 
made it difficult to find 
documents in jury room. 
Without compromise forced 
by the holdout, the verdict 
would have been highly 
defensible. 
Pennzoil v. Texaco 
The trial had two judges. 
The first made several 
mistaken evidentiary rulings 
that strongly hampered the 
defense case. The second 
posed a jury change that 
undermined the defendant's 
position. Defense counsel 
failed to put on expert 
witness to explain a key 
concept which the jury 
misunderstood and failed to 
offer jury any evidence or 
argument on damage issue. 
The plaintiff's attorney's 
contribution of $10,000 was 
the largest campaign 
contribution to the trial 
judge's reelection campaign. 
He also contributed $10,000 
to the judge's administrative 
judicial superior. 
Cleveland v. C.E.I.#l 
The judge seemed biased 
against city. The jury was 
not properly concerned with 
issue of the relevant market. 
The jury attitudes toward the 
size and identity of parties 
affected the verdict. The 
jury did not understand concept 
meaning of proximate cause, 
and failed to limit certain 
evidence to impeachment. After 
an early straw vote the jury 
did not function well. The 
jurors did not understand the 
instructions which were given 
orally in a 1 112 hour lecture 
by the trial judge, but seemed 




















Judge or Lawyer 
Responsibility 
Cleveland v. C.E.I. #2 
Austin (1984) 
Federal 
Antitrust, Attempt to 
monopolize 
11 weeks 
Need to understand difficult 
concepts like "natural 
monopoly". 
Copy of instructions allowed 
in deliberations - special 
interrogatories - preliminary 
instructions given which . 
summarized issues and 
defined terms - written final 
instructions. 
Moderate 
The jury seemed to under- 
stand high conduct testimony 
and most technical 









Vivid videotape could have 
distracted from other 
evidence. 
Written copy of instructions - 
copies furnished each juror 






U.S. v. Gaf. Corn 
Frankel (1989) 
Federal 
Stock Manipulation (criminal) 
6 weeks 
Need to understand how 




Table One (continued) 
U.S. v. Gaf. Corn. 
This was the 2nd mistrial in 
the case. The first was caused 
by a prosecutorial failure to 
disclose an expert's report to 
defense. The jury voted in the 
first half hour, with the jurors 
split into 3 groups. Many 
opinions changed during 
deliberations. The case turned 
on credibility issues. The 
jurors were not moved by a 
plea to "send a message to 
government" or by the 
government pointing out that 
the defendant's idea of 
community service was 
founding the Aspen Junior 
Golf Foundation. 
U.S. v. DeLorean (criminal) 
The judge did an excellent 
job in keeping things clear 
and being unbiased. The 
jury discussed matters 
thoroughly and 
systematically; juror 
mistakes were corrected by 
other jurors. 
Comments 
Cleveland v. C.E.I. #2 
Unlike the first case the 
judge provided the jury with 
a written copy of his 




















Judge or Lawyer 
Responsibility 
California v. Keating 
State 
Violating California 
Corporations Code and 
Fraud in selling bonds 
(criminal) 
10 + weeks 
Need to understand market 
in junk bonds and duties of 
buyers and sellers. Evidence 
entirely circumstantial. 
18 counts.involving 15 
individuals and 3 couples 











(poor), trial in phases. 
, 
Low - new trial needed 
because special questions 
inconsistently answered 
Technical, conflicting expert 
testimony, much of it dealt 
with hydrogeological issues. 
I Judge, lawyer 
Charles Newman, et al. v. 
Johns Manville. et al. 
Selvin & Picus 
Federal 
Products Liability - Asbestos 
7 days 
4 plaintiffs with differing stages 
of lung function impairment; 
substantial conflicting expert 
testimony, complex issues of 
medical causation, diagnosis 
and prognosis. 
Jurors furnished with trial 
notebooks containing listing 
of asbestos products 
manufactured by the defendants, 
copies of warnings used and 
dates of warnings, preliminary 
instructions on some issues. 
Notetaking allowed, jurors 
given 4 question verdict form. 
Liability: Moderately high 
Damages: Low (?) 
1 No Information 
Liability: High 
Damages: Low 
1 Damages: lawyer 
Table One (continued) 
Comments 
California v. Keating I 
No initial vote. The foreman 
encouraged a general discus- 
sion. First careful analysis 
of evidence and instructions. 
The jury was not swayed by 
dislike of one victim. 
There was a substantial 
conflict of views. No 
defense case was presented. 
- v. W.R. Grace & Co. I 
The jury interpreted its task 
in terms of guilt or innocence 
Jurors attempted to deal witk 
the evidence systematically 
and to look at the evidence 
from both sides. The verdict 
form had a "not determined 
response category that in 
effect decided the issue for 
the defense without the jury 
knowing it. Plaintiff's 
counsel did not explain that 
a "not determined answer 
was equivalent to a "no." 
Only one juror understood - 
the only "college grad." He 
kept quiet because he liked 
the result. Jury's answers 
to the verdict form were not 
reasonable, but judge asked 
misleading question. 
Charles Newman, et al. v. 
Johns Manville. et al. 
The authors argue that most 
damage awards were excessive, 
but that is because defense 
counsel never explained that if 
the plaintiffs had asbestos the 
disease would not progress 
equally in all plaintiffs. Also, the 
authors argue that one plaintiff's 
award was cut back due to his 
nationality, but the award was 
still substantial and fair 
viS-a-vis what others received. 
This plaintiff received the same 


























Breach of Contract, Conversion 






Table One (continued) 
The defendant intransigently 
refused to settle. The jurors 
misunderstood the judge's 
instructions on damages and 
misinterpreted the facts. The 
judge allowed a questionable 
cause of action to be added which 
opened the door to the punitive 
damages. The case lasted as 
long as it did because it was 
tried only 4 hours a day, 4 days 
a week. Crucial evidence on 
damages was excluded by the trial 
judge. Not much evidence was 
offered in support of the 
plaintiff's punitive damage 
request and nothing was offered 
by the defendant who simply 
asked for a zero verdict. A 
punitive damage instruction 
was misremembered. 
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